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SOLAR FINANCING IN NORTH CAROLINA:
THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF POWER
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS*
ANDREW J. HAILE**
Clean, renewable energy is an essential component of a modern
energy policy. Rooftop solar photovoltaic (“PV”) systems
constitute an important part of a state’s clean energy portfolio.
But these systems are too expensive for most individuals and
small businesses to buy outright. Instead, they must be financed.
One of the main methods used in other states for financing
rooftop solar PV systems is the power purchase agreement
(“PPA”). Under a typical PPA, a third-party financier installs a
solar PV system on a property owner’s rooftop and sells the
electricity generated by the system to the property owner. The
price for the electricity is usually lower than the price charged by
the property owner’s public utility. But the North Carolina
Utilities Commission (the “Utilities Commission”) has
prohibited the use of PPAs in North Carolina. According to the
Utilities Commission, the sale of electricity by a third-party
financier under a PPA violates the competitive monopoly
granted under state law to the public utility.
This prohibition against PPA will slow the spread of rooftop
solar PV systems in North Carolina. In addition to the
detrimental environmental effects this will have, there are also
equitable effects. Without PPAs, only the wealthy are able to
afford the economic benefits and environmental stewardship
resulting from solar ownership.
This Article contends that PPAs do not implicate the traditional
justifications for regulation by the Utilities Commission and are
therefore outside the Commission’s authority to prohibit. The
Article also offers both a legislative and a judicial solution to the
current prohibition against PPAs in North Carolina.

* © 2017 Andrew J. Haile.
** Associate Professor, Elon University School of Law. This Article is dedicated to
my friend and colleague, Michael L. Rich, whose innovative and humorous spirit
continues to inspire those who had the privilege of working with him.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, Faith Community Church, a historically
African-American church located in Greensboro, North Carolina,
entered into an agreement with the North Carolina Waste Reduction
and Awareness Network (“NC WARN”), a non-profit,
environmental organization.1 The agreement called for NC WARN to
install a solar photovoltaic (“PV”) system on the roof of the church.2
According to the terms of the agreement, known as a “power

1. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP100, SUB 31, at 1, 18 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n June 17, 2015) (Request for Declaratory
Ruling).
2. Id. at 1.
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purchase agreement” (“PPA”), NC WARN would pay the significant
upfront cost of the solar PV system and would sell the electricity
produced to the church at a reduced rate compared to the rate
charged by the church’s public utility, Duke Energy Carolinas (“Duke
Energy”).3 Without this arrangement, the church would not have
been able to afford the high cost of purchasing and installing the solar
panels on its own.4 The arrangement would lower the church’s
electricity expenses and better allow it to meet its mission of “striving
to be good stewards of God’s earth.”5 In turn, the stream of payments
would enable NC WARN to replicate this type of arrangement with
other churches, supporting its goal of reducing carbon output and
slowing climate change.6 The PPA benefited both parties.
In April 2016, however, the North Carolina Utilities Commission
(the “Utilities Commission” or “Commission”) struck down the
arrangement and ordered NC WARN to pay a fine of “$200 per day
for each day that NC WARN has provided and continues to provide
electric service to the Church.”7 Despite the fact that at the time of

3. Id. at 1–2. The PPA between Faith Community Church and NC WARN called for
NC WARN to sell to the church electricity produced by the PV system at a rate of $0.05
per kilowatt hour (“kWh”). N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN),
Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 1 n.1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL
1572367, at *1 n.1 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling). This is approximately half the price
of electricity sold by Duke Energy. See DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC, SMALL
GENERAL SERVICE SCHEDULE 1 (2017), https://www.duke-energy.com/_/media/pdfs/foryour-home/rates/electric-nc/g1ncschedulesgsdep.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/VS5X-UQME].
4. Telephone Interview with Nelson Johnson, Reverend, Faith Community Church
(Nov. 1, 2016). The inability to afford the full cost of a solar PV system up front is
common. See e.g., STEFAN LINDER & MICHEL DI CAPUA, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY
FIN., RE-IMAGINING US SOLAR FINANCING 1 (2012), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance
/content/re-imagining-us-solar-financing [https://perma.cc/EAW7-W85Z] (“Few homeowners
can afford the upfront cost of a solar system, giving rise to third-party financing models,
which allow them to ‘go solar’ with little or no money down.”).
5. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 2 (Request for Declaratory Ruling).
Attention to stewardship of natural resources has taken on increased importance in
various faith traditions. See, e.g., POPE FRANCIS, LAUDATO SI’ (2015), http://w2.vatican.va
/content/dam/francesco/pdf/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20150524_enciclicalaudato-si_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/3DAX-XGGS].
6. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 2 (Request for Declaratory
Ruling) (“Such a funding mechanism could potentially generate a revolving revenue
stream and allow NC WARN to provide similar projects to other non-profits in the
future.”). NC WARN states that its mission as “tackling the climate crisis – and other
hazards posed by electricity generation – by watch-dogging Duke Energy practices and
building people power for a swift North Carolina transition to clean, renewable and
affordable power generation and increased energy efficiency.” See Mission, NC WARN,
http://www.ncwarn.org/about-us/mission/ [https://perma.cc/WRB8-BEKL].
7. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 31, 2016 WL 1572367, at *31
(Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling). The Utilities Commission suspended the fine
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the Utilities Commission’s decision NC WARN had entered into only
one, specially-negotiated power purchase agreement (the one with
Faith Community Church), the Utilities Commission found that the
sale of electricity by NC WARN to the church under the PPA
rendered NC WARN a “public utility” under North Carolina law.8 As
a public utility, NC WARN was subject to regulation and oversight by
the Utilities Commission. Moreover, by selling electricity from the
solar PV system to the church, NC WARN had violated the exclusive
franchise9 granted by the Utilities Commission to Duke Energy to sell
electricity “to or for the public” in Greensboro.10 The Utilities
Commission’s decision that NC WARN, and by extension any
financing parties under future PPAs, was a public utility effectively
foreclosed the use of power purchase agreements in North Carolina.
The Utilities Commission’s decision is currently on appeal before the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina.11
In other states, PPAs constitute one of the primary means of
financing on-site solar PV systems and have been used without
detrimental effects to electric utilities or consumers. On-site solar PV
systems are a key component of “distributed generation” systems,

conditioned upon the non-profit returning all payments with ten percent interest to the
church and donating the solar panels to the church. Id. at 32, 2016 WL 1572367, at *32.
8. Id. at 28–29, 2016 WL 1572367, at *28–29.
9. North Carolina’s Public Utilities Act defines “franchise” as “the grant of authority
by the [Utilities] Commission to any person to engage in business as a public utility,
whether or not exclusive or shared with others or restricted as to terms and conditions and
whether described by area or territory or not, and includes certificates, and all other forms
of licenses or orders and decisions granting such authority.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(11)
(2015).
10. Duke’s exclusive franchise extends to several areas in North Carolina, including
the state’s most populous urban centers. The exclusive franchise was assigned to Duke
pursuant to the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965. See Territorial Assignment Act of
1965, ch. 287, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 328–41 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2
(relating to electric service outside the corporate limits of municipalities) and §§ 160A-331
to -338 (relating to electric service within the corporate limits of municipalities)); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-334 (authorizing the North Carolina Utilities Commission to
order a “secondary supplier” of electricity, such as NC WARN, to cease and desist in the
provision of electricity to a consumer in a region assigned to a “primary supplier,” such as
Duke Energy). As explained by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, the purpose of
the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965 was “to eliminate the ‘uneconomic duplication of
transmission and distribution systems’ bred of unbridled competition between public
utilities, electric membership corporations and municipalities by designating the various
competitors’ rights.” Morgan v. Hertford, 70 N.C. App. 725, 727, 321 S.E.2d 170, 172
(1984) (quoting Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 203 S.E.2d 838
(1974)).
11. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP100, SUB 31, at 1–7 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n May 16, 2016) (Notice of Appeal and
Exceptions).
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which produce electricity at or near the location where it is used,
rather than at a centralized generation facility.12 Distributed
generation through the use of on-site (typically rooftop) solar PV
systems is known as “distributed solar.”13 The decision to eliminate
the use of PPAs in North Carolina will slow the spread of distributed
solar in the state. This will have detrimental environmental and
equitable effects. More distributed solar would allow for a reduction
in the use of electricity produced by coal-fired power plants.14 This
would, in turn, reduce carbon emissions and help to slow climate
change. Additionally, a reduction on the reliance of electricity from
coal-fired plants may help to avoid the type of environmental disaster
experienced by residents of Stokes County in February 2014, when
39,000 tons of coal ash from Duke Energy’s Dan River Steam Station
spilled into the Dan River.15
In addition, because the North Carolina statutes allow an
exclusion from the definition of “public utility” for consumers who
can afford to self-finance their on-site solar PV systems,16 prohibiting
PPAs prevents only those who lack the means to self-finance PV
systems from enjoying the economic and environmental-stewardship
benefits of solar-generated electricity. By prohibiting PPAs in North
Carolina, environmental stewardship and lower-cost, clean electricity
have been limited to the “haves” and kept beyond the reach of the
“have-nots.”17
This Article examines the practical, legal, and policy issues
involved in financing on-site solar PV systems through PPAs. Part I
starts by giving a brief overview of the economics of distributed solar
production. Part II reviews the statutory and case law background as
to what constitutes a “public utility” under North Carolina law. Part
12. Distributed Solar, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy
/distributed-solar [https://perma.cc/EY7F-5GUC].
13. Id.
14. Duke Energy currently operates seven coal-fired power plants in North Carolina:
Allen Steam Station (Gaston County); Asheville Plant (Skyland, NC); Belews Creek
Steam Station (Stokes County); Cliffside Steam Station (Cleveland and Rutherford
Counties); Marshall Steam Station (Catawba County); Mayo Plant (Roxboro, NC); and
Roxboro Steam Plant (Semora, NC). Power Plants, DUKE ENERGY, https://www.dukeenergy.com/our-company/about-us/power-plants [https://perma.cc/5N2B-SHLL].
15. History and Response Timeline, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov
/dukeenergy-coalash/history-and-response-timeline [https://perma.cc/VYT9-XG5Q].
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015).
17. Immediately prior to the time of publication of this Article, the North Carolina
General Assembly enacted H.B. 589, which impacts some of the issues discussed in the
Article. The legislation does not, however, affect the arguments in favor of power
purchase agreements set forth in the Article. See Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589) 2017
N.C. Sess. Laws __.
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III then reviews the decision by the North Carolina Utilities
Commission in NC WARN to prohibit PPAs, and Part IV examines
how that decision is consistent with some and in tension with other
earlier Utilities Commission decisions. Part V then contrasts the NC
WARN decision with a decision by the Iowa Supreme Court to allow
PPAs in that state. Part VI goes on to explain why the traditional
policy justifications for regulating public utilities do not apply to
companies, like NC WARN, that seek to provide financing for solar
PV systems through power purchase agreements. Finally, Part VII
argues that the Supreme Court of North Carolina or the North
Carolina General Assembly should act to allow PPAs in North
Carolina. Unless such action is taken, North Carolina will continue to
lag behind other states in developing cleaner, more equitable energy
policies.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE ECONOMICS OF SOLAR PV SYSTEMS
Because of the significant upfront costs of solar PV systems, most
individuals and businesses cannot afford to purchase them outright.18
Instead, most consumers wanting to use solar energy to reduce their
environmental footprint and lower their electricity costs must rely on
third-party financing. The most common forms of third-party
financing for distributed solar PV systems are solar leases and PPAs.19
Under a solar lease, “a customer agrees to pay a fixed lease
payment in exchange for the right to use all of the power produced by

18. DAVID FELDMAN & MARK BOLINGER, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., ON
THE PATH TO SUNSHOT: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN FINANCING
SOLAR 19, 21 (2016), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy16osti/65638.pdf [https://perma.cc/QAT9VCDG] (“In 2014, approximately 28% of new residential PV systems were customer
owned. . . . Residential PV historically has a high upfront cost, which significantly limits
the pool of customers with that amount of cash on hand.”). A National Renewable Energy
Laboratory (NREL) report models a typical 5.2kW solar PV system as costing on average
$3.09/W (or $15,900 in total) during the first quarter of 2015. See DONALD CHUNG ET AL.,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., U.S. PHOTOVOLTAIC PRICES AND COST
BREAKDOWNS: Q1 2015 BENCHMARKS FOR RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, AND UTILITYSCALE SYSTEMS 7 (2015), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy15osti/64746.pdf [https://perma.cc
/RVL8-RF86]. The NREL further reports that the “median reported U.S. residential
system had a capacity of 6.1kW in 2014 and cost approximately $26,000—which is 40% less
than the $44,000 a similarly sized system would have cost in 2010.” FELDMAN &
BOLINGER, supra, at 18. The PV system installed on the roof of Faith Community Church
was 5.2 kW. See N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No.
SP-100, SUB 31, at 1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n June 17, 2017) (Request for Declaratory
Ruling).
19. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 23. According to NREL, third-party
ownership systems, including solar leases and power purchase agreements, accounted for
“approximately 72% of the residential PV market installed in 2014.” Id.
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[a] PV system” located on the customer’s property.20 The third-party
financier (the “solar financier”), or an agent working on its behalf,
installs the solar PV system on the customer’s property.21 Although
the solar PV system may be located on the customer’s rooftop, the
solar financier retains legal ownership of the PV system.22 Under the
terms of a typical solar lease, the customer pays the solar financier a
set monthly fee for the use of the solar PV system, regardless of the
amount of electricity that the system actually produces.23 The solar
financier commonly agrees under the solar lease to provide
maintenance and upkeep of the system in the event of any problems
during the term of the lease.24
In contrast, with a power purchase agreement, “the customer
agrees to buy the power generated by the system at a set price per
kilowatt-hour.”25 Under this approach, the solar financier or its agent
installs the solar PV system on the customer’s property and, as with a
solar lease, the solar financier retains ownership of the system.26

20. Id.
21. SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., MODEL POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT FOR
RESIDENTIAL CUSTOMERS (AGGREGATED) 2, http://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/resources
/SAPC%20Residential_PPA%20Agreement%20_CA_%20Aggregated_Clean_5-20-16.doc
[https://perma.cc/7BBE-SMFN] (“The System will be installed by [Provider] at the address
[the customer] listed above.”).
22. Id. at 5.
23. Note, however, that the form solar lease for residential customers created by the
Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA) provides for inclusion of a performance
guaranty that allows for a refund on lease payments in the event that the solar PV system
generates less electricity than guaranteed by the lessor. See id. at 14 (“[Provider]
guarantees that during the Power Purchase Agreement Term the System will operate
within manufacturer’s specifications and if it does not that [Provider] will repair or replace
any defective part and restore System performance.”).
24. See id. at 3 (requiring the lessor to “repair the System pursuant to the Limited
Warranty and reasonably cooperate with [the lessee] when scheduling repairs”).
25. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 23. For a form power purchase
agreement developed by the Interstate Renewable Energy Council, see INTERSTATE
RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, SOLAR ENERGY POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT AND
SALE, http://www.irecusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Final_Clean_PPA_Template.docx
[https://perma.cc/HPC2-AR3R].
26. See Solar Power Purchase Agreements: a Toolkit for Local Governments,
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, 1-1, 3-1 (Mar. 2015), http://www.irecusa.org
/publications/solar-power-purchase-agreements-a-toolkit-for-local-governments/
[https://perma.cc/2ER3-FWGK]. (“A retail solar PPA is a long-term contract to purchase
power from a third-party owner and operator of a solar energy generation system. This
contrasts with a ‘direct-ownership’ arrangement, where the local government itself owns a
solar project.”).
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Rather than paying a set monthly fee for the electricity produced by
the system, the PPA customer pays only for the use of the system.27
Therefore, under both a solar lease and a PPA, the solar PV
system located on the customer’s property is owned by the solar
financier. The major difference between the solar lease and the PPA
is that with a lease the customer pays a flat monthly amount for the
use of the solar PV system, while under a PPA the customer pays a
specified amount for each kilowatt hour (“kWh”) of electricity
generated by the solar PV system.28 To illustrate, the terms of the
solar lease may call for the customer to pay $50 per month for the use
of a solar PV system, regardless of the amount of electricity produced
by the system; the PPA, on the other hand, might call for the
customer to pay $0.05 per kWh of electricity produced by the system,
with the customer paying only for the electricity actually generated.
From the customer’s perspective, PPAs are often considered more
attractive than solar leases because of the reduced risk of
overpayment. Since a customer only pays for the electricity actually
produced under a PPA, the customer does not run the risk of
“overpaying” if the solar PV system produces less electricity than
anticipated.29
The method for financing solar PV systems is only one aspect of
the economics of distributed solar. Tax incentives and net metering
are two other important components. As mentioned above, the solar
financier retains ownership of the PV system under both a solar lease
and a PPA. By retaining ownership, the financier is able to take
advantage of substantial tax benefits or pass those benefits on to tax
equity investors.30 The tax benefits enable the solar financier, in many
27. Types of Solar Leases and PPAs, ENERGYSAGE, https://www.energysage.com
/solar/financing/types-of-solar-leases-and-ppas [https://perma.cc/V79R-CBH2] (describing
the differences between solar leases and power purchase agreements).
28. Id.
29. See MARK BOLINGER, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
OPTIONS
AND
FINANCING NON-RESIDENTIAL PHOTOVOLTAIC PROJECTS:
IMPLICATIONS 18 (2009), https://stuff.mit.edu/afs/athena/dept/cron/Backup/project/urbansustainability/Old%20files%20from%20summer%202009/Bjorn/solar/financing%20nonres%20pv%20projects%20Berkley%20Lab%202009.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HCW-GL6D]
(“The primary difference [between solar leases and PPAs]—which reportedly is a major
selling point for the PPA—is that, under a PPA, the site host is not required to operate
and maintain the system, and likewise faces no performance risk. In short, the PPA model
effectively provides the site host what it presumably really wants—solar power at an
affordable price, rather than solar equipment that it must operate and maintain.”)
(footnote and citation omitted).
30. A tax-exempt customer, such as Faith Community Church, would not be able to
take advantage of these tax benefits if it owned the solar PV system, since the tax-exempt
customer is not subject to tax and therefore has no use for the tax benefits. The third party
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instances, to charge a lower rate to the customer for the energy
generated by the solar PV system than the public utility charges.31 On
the federal level, the tax benefits include a thirty percent Investment
Tax Credit,32 as well as a five-year accelerated depreciation
schedule.33 Depending on the state where the customer is located,
state tax benefits may also apply. North Carolina, for example,
provided for a thirty-five percent income tax credit for solar PV
systems installed before December 31, 2015, when the General
Assembly allowed this tax credit to expire.34
Another factor in the economics of distributed solar is so-called
“net metering.” As defined by the Solar Energy Industries
Association, net metering “allows residential and commercial

owner in a power purchase agreement, on the other hand, is typically a taxable entity or
serves as a conduit to taxable investors and therefore is able to take advantage of the tax
benefits. The facts of the NC WARN decision are somewhat unusual in that a tax-exempt
entity (NC WARN) served as third-party owner under the power purchase agreement. NC
WARN entered into the PPA with Faith Community Church, despite being unable to take
advantage of the tax benefits, as a “test case” in hopes of opening the market for financing
solar PV systems in North Carolina in furtherance of its mission to combat climate change.
In large-scale solar projects, tax equity investors are used, since relatively few individuals
or third-party financiers could take advantage of the significant amount of tax savings
available. See Keith Martin, Solar Tax Equity Structures, CHADBOURNE & PARKE LLP
(Sept. 2015), http://www.chadbourne.com/Solar_Tax_Equity_Structures_projectfinance
[https://perma.cc/ECB5-M2VJ] (providing a description of tax equity structures commonly
used in financing solar projects); see also LINDER & DI CAPUA, supra note 4, at 5–10
(describing the various business models for “solar deployment”).
31. In the event that the solar PV site host is a tax exempt entity, the arrangement
with the solar financier may need to be structured as a PPA, rather than a solar lease, in
order for the solar financier to be able to take advantage of the tax benefits. See I.R.C.
§ 168(h)(1)(B)(ii) (2012) (setting out rules regarding “disqualified leases”); see also
BOLINGER, supra note 29, at 24 (“Since tax-exempt entities cannot enter into a ‘normal’
lease transaction (i.e., a taxable operating or capital lease . . . ) without jeopardizing the
use (by either the lessor or the lessee) of the project’s Tax Benefits, it is vital that a solar
PPA with a tax-exempt site host be properly structured as a service contract, so that it
cannot be misconstrued as a lease.”).
32. I.R.C. § 25D (2012) (residential); id. § 48 (2012) (commercial and utility); see also,
Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org
/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/X9T5-AZN2].
33. I.R.C. § 168(e)(3)(B)(I) (2012); see also Depreciation of Solar Energy Property in
MACRS, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N., http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax
/depreciation-solar-energy-property-macrs [https://perma.cc/JE38-HVKB] (explaining the
Modified Acceleration Cost Recovery System); Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC), supra
note 32.
34. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.16A(a) (2015); Renewable Energy Tax Credit
(Personal), DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY &
EFFICIENCY, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., http://programs.dsireusa.org/system
/program/detail/541 [https://perma.cc/L6ES-2Z8K] (last updated Feb. 2, 2017) (“This
credit expired at the end of 2015. Systems installed in 2016 or later years will not qualify
for this credit.”).
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customers who generate their own electricity from solar power to
feed electricity they do not use back into the grid.”35 When a solar PV
system produces more electricity than the customer is using at any
particular time, the excess electricity is fed back into the grid and the
customer is credited for that excess electricity. As a result, customers
with solar PV systems are billed by the public utility only for the
“net” electricity they use—electricity consumed from the grid less
electricity fed into the grid. Some states, like North Carolina, offer a
one-to-one credit for solar-generated electricity fed into the grid by
customers.36 This means that if a solar PV system located on a
customer’s property generates one kWh of electricity more than the
customer uses, and that kWh is fed into the grid, the customer is
credited for one kWh that the customer later consumes from the grid.
Other states have less generous net metering policies, crediting
customers at less than a one-to-one rate for electricity that the
customer feeds into the grid.37 The amount of credit received by a
customer for electricity produced by a solar PV system located on the
customer’s property and fed into the electric grid factors heavily into
the financial analysis of whether opting for distributed solar makes
sense.38
35. See Net Metering, SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy
/distributed-solar/net-metering [https://perma.cc/D3WP-WHLL]. The North Carolina
Utilities Commission has defined net metering as “the billing arrangement whereby the
customer-generator is billed according to the difference over a billing period between the
amount of energy consumed by the customer at its premises and the amount of energy
generated by the renewable energy facility.” Investigation of Proposed Net Metering
Rule, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 3, 245 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th (PUR) 134, 137 (N.C Utils.
Comm’n Oct. 20, 2005), 2005 WL 2709031.
36. North Carolina’s current net metering policy is set forth in a 2009 Order by the
Utilities Commission. See Investigation of Net Metering, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 1,
272 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th (PUR) 323, 323–24 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Mar. 31, 2009). But see
Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (directing the Utilities
Commission to establish new net metering rates).
37. Nevada, for example, credits customers at the “avoided cost” rate rather than at
the full retail rate for electricity fed into the grid. See Net Metering, DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY & EFFICIENCY, NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH.
CTR., http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program/detail/372 (last updated Oct. 28, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/3E44-T8ZM]. The “avoided cost” rate is the price that the public utility
would have to pay to generate electricity itself or the amount it would pay to acquire
electricity on the open market, essentially the wholesale cost of electricity rather than the
retail rate paid by public utilities in North Carolina. See id. (“All exported generation is
credited at the avoided cost rate. Any credits that exceed the customer’s monthly bill will
be carried over to the next billing period. Remaining credits at the end of the year will be
paid to the customer.”).
38. Under the terms of a typical power purchase agreement, the host customer is
billed for all electricity generated by the on-site solar PV system, but is allowed the benefit
of the net metering credit for any excess electricity fed into the grid. See INTERSTATE
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Thus, the primary economic factors in deciding whether to
participate in the distributed solar market include the direct cost of
the solar PV system and the financing options available for bearing
that cost, the tax benefits associated with the installation and use of
the PV system, and the amount of credit allowed for excess electricity
generated by the solar PV system and fed into the grid. North
Carolina has hampered the spread of distributed solar by disallowing
PPAs, one of the main methods for financing PV systems, and by
failing to retain state-level tax incentives for solar electricity
production. The state does maintain one of the more generous net
metering policies,39 but, given the decision in NC WARN, the benefit
of net metering is available only to consumers who can afford the
high upfront cost of purchasing a solar PV. Thus, the State’s
restrictive financing policy and favorable net metering policy combine
to exacerbate economic inequality, as only the wealthy can afford to
participate in the solar PV market and thereby receive the benefit of
the State’s net metering policy.40 Ironically, as discussed below, the
rationale behind the Utilities Commission’s decision in NC WARN
was to protect the economic interests of consumers who do not

RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, supra note 26, at 7–13 (“Any output not immediately
usable by Host Customer will be exported to the Host Utility pursuant to Interconnection
and Net Metering Agreements.”); see also SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, supra note 35
(“Net metering is a billing mechanism that credits solar energy system owners for
electricity they add to the grid.”).
39. Arguably, a one-for-one credit for electricity fed into the grid overcompensates
the customer, since the customer is effectively getting the equivalent of battery storage of
the electricity that the solar PV system produces without having to pay for that storage.
See FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18–19 (stating that most residential systems
feedback into the grid and are credited at retail rates). See also Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B.
589), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws __ (directing the Utilities Commission to establish new net
metering rates).
40. The North Carolina Utilities Commission has defined net metering as “the billing
arrangement whereby the customer-generator is billed according to the difference over a
billing period between the amount of energy consumed by the customer at its premises
and the amount of energy generated by the renewable energy facility.” See Investigation of
Proposed Net Metering Rule, Docket No. E-100, SUB 83, at 3, 245 Pub. Utils. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 134, 137 (emphasis added). It is not clear from this definition whether a solar
financier would be permitted to take advantage of the State’s net metering policy, since
the solar financier is arguably not a “customer-generator.” If the solar generator is allowed
to participate in net metering, that benefit could be passed through to the host consumer.
See id. If not, allowing host consumers to enter into PPAs and receive the resulting benefit
of reduced costs for electricity would still mitigate the inequality that currently exists in
which only the wealthy benefit from both subsidized solar electricity (subsidized through
the tax benefits available) and from the State’s net metering policy. See Ashley Brown &
Jillian Bunyan, Valuation of Distributed Solar: A Qualitative View, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 27,
27 (2014) (noting that retail net metering “effectively transfers wealth from less affluent to
more affluent consumers”).
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participate in the solar PV market. The effect of the NC WARN
decision, however, is to allow only those who can afford to selffinance solar PV systems to reap the benefits of the State’s favorable
net metering policy.41
II. STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BACKGROUND
In order to understand the Utilities Commission’s decision to
prohibit power purchase agreements in NC WARN, it is first helpful
to understand the statutory and case law background that informed
the decision.

A. Statutory Background: Definition of a “Public Utility”
By statute, North Carolina allows for the sale of electricity by
only one “public utility” in a specified geographic area.42 The North
Carolina General Statutes define a “public utility” as follows:
[A] person, whether organized under the laws of this State or
under the laws of any other state or country, now or hereafter
owning or operating in this State equipment or facilities for . . .
producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing
electricity, piped gas, steam or any other like agency for the
production of light, heat or power to or for the public for
compensation; provided, however, that the term “public utility”
shall not include persons who construct or operate an electric
generating facility, the primary purpose of which facility is for
41. See Brown & Bunyan, supra note 40, at 44 (arguing that retail net metering
provides a subsidy from non-solar customers to distributed solar generators). But see Mark
Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering is a Net Benefit, BROOKINGS (May
23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/rooftop-solar-net-metering-is-a-net-benefit/
[https://perma.cc/CV5Q-8SSA] (listing numerous studies contending that “net metering
benefits all utility customers”). See also Act of June 30, 2017, (H.B. 589), 2017 N.C. Sess.
Laws __ (directing the Utilities Commission to establish new net metering rates).
42. This was incorporated into statute by the Territorial Assignment Act of 1965. See
ch. 287, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 328, 328–41 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-110.2, 160A331 to -38). See also Morgan v. Hertford, 70 N.C. App. 725, 727, 321 S.E.2d 170, 172 (1984)
(“The Territorial Assignment Act of 1965 . . . represents an attempt to eliminate the
‘uneconomic duplication of transmission and distribution systems’ bred of unbridled
competition between public utilities, electric membership corporations and municipalities
by designating the various competitors’ rights.”) (quoting Domestic Elec. Serv., Inc. v.
Rocky Mount, 285 N.C. 135, 203 S.E.2d 838 (1974))). As explained by the North Carolina
Utilities Commission, under the “traditional regulatory bargain,” public utilities exchange
the “benefit of monopoly franchised service territory for [the] obligation to provide
adequate service at reasonable rates.” N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC
UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND REGULATORY CLIMATE 4 (July 2016), http://www.ncuc
.commerce.state.nc.us/overview/Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5LX-NKDV].
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such person’s own use and not for the primary purpose of
producing electricity, heat, or steam for sale to or for the public
for compensation.43
Unquestionably, the solar financier under a power purchase
agreement owns equipment, the solar PV system, for delivering
electricity to the host consumer. That is the very essence of the
PPA—the financier retains ownership of the PV system (primarily to
obtain the accompanying tax benefits associated with that ownership)
and sells the electricity produced by the system to the consumer. At
its core then, the determination of whether the solar financier is a
“public utility” as defined by statute depends on whether this
arrangement is deemed to amount to furnishing electricity “to or for
the public.”44 If it is, the arrangement established by the power
purchase agreement violates the incumbent public utility’s exclusive
franchise to sell electricity to the public in the particular geographic
area.
It is important to note that the second part of the definition of
“public utility” contains the exception for those who can afford to
purchase solar PV systems outright, rather than needing to enter into
a financing arrangement like a power purchase agreement. The
statute states that the term “public utility” does not include “persons
who construct or operate an electric generating facility, the primary
purpose of which facility is for such person’s own use and not for the
primary purpose of producing electricity . . . for sale to or for the
public for compensation.”45 Thus, if a consumer can afford to
purchase a solar PV system outright, the statute specifically excludes
that consumer from the definition of public utility. Only consumers
who cannot afford the high upfront cost of solar PV systems need to
worry about whether the arrangements they enter into to finance the
systems come within the jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission.
B.

Case Law Precedent: State ex rel. Utilities Commission v.
Simpson46

According to the North Carolina Utilities Commission, “the
most significant case addressing the issue of ‘sales to or for the public’

43.
44.
45.
46.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
295 N.C. 519, 246 S.E.2d 753 (1978).
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is State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson.”47 In Simpson, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina considered whether two-way radio services
offered by a physician, Dr. William Simpson, to fifty-five to sixty
other members of the Cleveland County Medical Society constituted
an offer of the service “to or for the public[,]” and therefore rendered
Dr. Simpson a public utility subject to regulation by the Utilities
Commission.48
The Simpson court explained that the provision of a service “to
or for the public” does not necessarily mean that the service must be
offered to “everybody all the time.”49 In other words, the fact that Dr.
Simpson offered two-way radio service only to members of his
medical society, and not to the public at large, did not preclude a
finding that the service was offered “to the public” within the
meaning of the statute. The Simpson court quoted from an earlier
Supreme Court of North Carolina case, Utilities Commission v.
Carolina Telephone and Telegraph Co,50. in support of this
proposition, stating
One offers service to the “public” within the meaning of [the
public utility] statute when he holds himself out as willing to
serve all who apply up to the capacity of his facilities. It is
immaterial, in this connection, that his service is limited to a
specified area and his facilities are limited in capacity. For
example, the operator of a single vehicle within a single
community may be a common carrier.51
According to the Simpson court, this language from Carolina
Telephone did not foreclose the possibility that a service offered only
to a “selected class of persons might also be considered an offering to
the ‘public.’ ”52 To resolve this issue of whether a service offered only
to a subgroup of persons (Cleveland County doctors in the Simpson
case) constitutes an offer “to or for the public[,]” the Simpson court
first reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions. The court
summarized the “teaching[s]” from these cases as follows:
47. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100,
SUB 31, at 18 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *18 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
48. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 520, 246 S.E.2d 753, 754
(1978).
49. Id. at 522, 246 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of
Columbia, 241 U.S. 252, 255 (1916)).
50. 267 N.C. 257, 148 S.E.2d 100 (1966).
51. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 522, 246 S.E.2d at 755 (quoting Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267
N.C. at 268, 148 S.E.2d at 109).
52. Id. at 523, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
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[W]hether any given enterprise is a public utility within the
meaning of a regulatory scheme does not depend on some
abstract, formulistic definition of “public” to be thereafter
universally applied. What is the “public” in any given case
depends rather on the regulatory circumstances of that case.
Some of these circumstances are (1) nature of the industry
sought to be regulated; (2) type of market served by the
industry; (3) the kind of competition that naturally inheres in
that market; and (4) effect of non-regulation or exemption from
regulation of one or more persons engaged in the industry. The
meaning of “public” must in the final analysis be such as will, in
the context of the regulatory circumstances . . . accomplish the
legislature’s purpose and comport with its public policy.53
The Simpson court went on to endorse the position previously
taken by the supreme courts of Iowa and New Mexico that “sales to
sufficient of the public to clothe the operation with a public interest”
amount to an offering “to or for the public” and therefore come
within the definition of a public utility.54 According to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in Simpson, “[i]t is this type of flexible
interpretation that is necessary to comport legislative purpose with
the variable nature of modern technology.”55
In light of this standard, the Simpson court examined the
characteristics of the radio common carrier market in Cleveland
County, where Dr. Simpson was offering the two-way radio service.
The court stated that the market was “a small one whose users fall
into definable classes,” such as doctors, real estate agents, and
builders.56 Dr. Simpson had offered his two-way radio service to the
fifty-five to sixty members of the Cleveland County Medical Society,
and he was actually providing the service to ten of those members.57
The court stated that there were “only 22 radio common carrier
subscribers in the whole of Cleveland County” and, as a result, Dr.
Simpson was providing service for “over 45% of the available
market.”58
Based on these facts about the two-way radio service market in
Cleveland County, the court concluded that if a definition of “public”
were adopted that “allowed prospective offerors of services to
53. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756–57 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson,
32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1977)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
56. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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approach . . . separate classes [such as doctors, real estate agents, and
builders] without falling under the statute, the industry could easily
shift from a regulated to a largely unregulated one.”59 According to
the court, “the end result . . . could well be that the only subscribers
left in the regulated market would be those who fit in no easily
definable class.”60 The court predicted that “unregulated radio
services might focus on classes which are easier and more profitable
to serve[,]” with the result being to “leave burdensome, less profitable
service on the regulated portion resulting inevitably in higher prices
for the service.”61
Thus, after laying out four “regulatory circumstances” that it
deemed relevant in determining what constitutes “the ‘public’ ” for
public utility purposes, the Simpson court focused on just two of those
circumstances: (1) the type of market served by the industry; and (2)
the effect of non-regulation.62 With respect to the type of market
served by the radio common carrier industry, the court characterized
the market as small and comprised primarily of users who could be
designated into separate, definable categories such as doctors, real
estate agents, and builders.63 As to the effect of non-regulation, the
court found that unregulated providers of two-way radio services
served a significant portion of the overall market (over forty-five
percent by Dr. Simpson alone), potentially resulting in increased costs
for those who did not fall into the definable categories that
unregulated competitors were likely to target and serve.64 The court
did not expressly discuss the other two “regulatory circumstances”
(nature of the industry and kind of competition that naturally inheres
in the market) that it had declared to be relevant in determining
whether regulation by the Utilities Commission would “accomplish
‘the legislature’s purpose and comport with its public policy.’ ”65 In
summary, the Simpson court concluded that if Dr. Simpson (and
anyone else who, like him, offered two-way radio service in Cleveland
County) were not considered a public utility and therefore not
regulated by the Utilities Commission, the two-way radio market
would effectively become an unregulated market, resulting in higher

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
63. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson,
32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1977)).
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prices for the few remaining consumers who were not able to receive
service from an unregulated service provider.66
The decision in Simpson allows for substantial subjectivity in
determining whether a service is offered to “the public” and therefore
comes within the regulatory jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission.
The “regulatory circumstances” introduced by the court as relevant to
the determination are both nonexhaustive67 and, based on the
absence of any discussion of two of those circumstances in the
Simpson case itself, apparently nonessential. Thus, Simpson provides
only loose guidance for a tribunal (a court or the Utilities
Commission) in determining whether a service is offered “to or for
the public” and therefore subject to regulation by the Utilities
Commission.68 As explained by the Simpson court, the regulatory
circumstances enumerated in the opinion are ultimately intended to
assist the decision maker in assessing whether regulation of the
proffered service will “accomplish the legislature’s purpose and
comport with its public policy.”69
Given the flexibility provided in the Simpson case, identifying
those services that the General Assembly would intend to be
regulated by the Utilities Commission has proven somewhat
unpredictable. This is the case, at least in part, because the General
Assembly has made numerous public policy pronouncements relating
to energy production. Specifically, the General Assembly has stated
that it is the “declared policy” of the State to work towards the
following goals:
1. “To promote the inherent advantage of regulated public
utilities”70
2. “To promote adequate, reliable, and economical utility service
to all of the citizens and residents of the state”71
3. “To assure that resources necessary to meet future growth
through the provision of adequate, reliable utility service include use
of the entire spectrum of demand-side options, including but not
limited to conservation, load management and efficiency programs, as

66. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
67. The court characterized the four factors it set forth as “some” of the regulatory
circumstances relevant to determining whether a service was offered “to the public.” Id. at
524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
68. Id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
69. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting Simpson, 32 N.C. App. 543, 546, 232 S.E.2d
871, 873 (1977)).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(2) (2015).
71. Id. § 62-2(a)(3).
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additional sources of energy supply and/or energy demand
reductions”72
4. “To encourage and promote harmony between public utilities,
their users and the environment”73
In addition, the General Assembly has declared it is the policy of
the State to “promote the development of renewable energy and
energy efficiency through the implementation of a Renewable Energy
and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS).”74 Under the
REPS requirement, all electric public utilities, including investorowned utilities such as Duke Energy, are required by 2021 to meet at
least 12.5% of the State’s energy needs through renewable energy
resources and energy efficiency measures.75 As explained by the
General Assembly, the REPS requirement is intended to do all of the
following:
1. “Diversify the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs
of consumers in the State”
2. “Provide greater energy security through the use of indigenous
energy resources available within the State”
3. “Encourage private investment in renewable energy and
energy efficiency”
4. “Provide improved air quality and other benefits to energy
consumers and citizens of the State”76
The potentially conflicting policies of “promot[ing] the inherent
advantage of regulated public utilities”77 while also “promot[ing] the
development of renewable energy and energy efficiency”78 has led to
a series of pre-NC WARN decisions by the Utilities Commission that
prove difficult to reconcile. Part III briefly discusses those decisions
before turning to an analysis of the NC WARN decision itself.
III. PRE-NC WARN UTILITIES COMMISSION DECISIONS
CONSTRUING “TO OR FOR THE PUBLIC”
Before the Utilities Commission’s decision in NC WARN, the
Commission construed the meaning of the term “to or for the
public[,]” as that term is used in the statutory definition of a public
utility, in six key decisions. Those decisions are described below.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. § 62-2(a)(3a).
Id. § 62-2(a)(5).
Id. § 62-2(a)(10).
Id. § 62-133.8(b).
Id. § 62-2(a)(10).
Id. § 62-2(a)(2).
Id. § 62-2(a)(10).
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A. Natural Power, Inc. (1988)
In Natural Power, Inc., Raleigh Landfill Gas Corp., (“Natural
Power”),79 the Utilities Commission decided that the sale of both gas
and steam via individually negotiated contracts did not render the
sellers public utilities.80 Under the facts of the case, a landfill owner
(Raleigh Landfill Gas Corporation) entered into an agreement to sell
landfill gas to a single customer (Natural Power, Inc.).81 Natural
Power, Inc., in turn planned to use the gas to generate steam, which it
contracted to sell to a pharmaceutical plant owned by Ajinomoto,
USA, Inc.82 Ajinomoto intended to use the steam for pharmaceutical
processing and related business purposes.83
In concluding that neither Raleigh Landfill nor Natural Power
should be regulated as public utilities, the Commission relied on four
main factors. First, the end product of the various activities involved
was steam, which “has not been regulated to the same degree” as
electricity.84 Second, the contracts involved were “bargained for”
transactions between individual corporations rather than offers to the
public at large.85 Third, the steam provided by Natural Power to
Ajinomoto would be used in Ajinomoto’s industrial processes rather
than to generate electricity, and the steam would not be resold to
other parties.86 And fourth, the steam provided by Natural Power
would not meet all of Ajinomoto’s needs, and Ajinomoto would
remain dependent on the incumbent public utility for the balance of
its steam needs.87 This meant that “not all public utility revenues from
Ajinomoto [would] be diverted.”88 Based on these factors, the
Utilities Commission held that the arrangement did not call for
regulation of any of the parties as a public utility.89

79. Docket No. SP-100, SUB 1, 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 340 (N.C. Utils.
Comm’n Dec. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 391223.
80. Id. at 343.
81. Id. at 341.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 342.
85. Id. at 342–43.
86. Id. at 343.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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National Spinning Co. (1996)

The proposed arrangement in National Spinning Co.,90 involved
two parties working together to produce electricity. As proposed, a
gasifier owned by National Spinning Company, Inc. (“National
Spinning”) would gasify wood waste.91 The resulting gas would be
sold by National Spinning to Wayne S. Leary (“Leary”).92 Leary
would run the gas through a steamer, which he owned.93 Leary would
then sell the resulting steam to National Spinning, which would, in
turn, pass the steam through a steam turbine and other electric
generating facilities owned by National Spinning to produce
electricity.94 National Spinning planned to use the electricity for its
own industrial purposes.95 The company did not expect the
arrangement with Leary to meet all of its electricity needs, however,
so National Spinning would remain connected to the grid and
continue to purchase electricity from the incumbent public utility,
Carolina Power & Light (“CP & L”).96
Under these facts, the Commission denied the petition by
National Spinning and Leary for a declaratory ruling that “no
regulated utility would result from the proposed activities.”97 The
Commission based its decision in large part on the negative
consequences it believed would result from the arrangement, and
similar ones that might follow, to both electric utilities and the public
at large. With respect to the incumbent electric utility, the
Commission stated that “unregulated electric suppliers could ‘cherry
pick’ the electric utilities’ best customers, leaving them with
significant stranded investment.”98 It explained that regulated electric
utilities plan and build generation plants based on the needs of large
industrial customers, like National Spinning, which spent more than
$3 million annually in electricity costs.99 If unregulated electricity
suppliers were allowed to lure away this type of highly desirable
customer, the public utility might not make the expected return on its
investment in generating facilities intended to serve such customers.
Ultimately, this would harm other consumers, as the lost revenues
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 252627.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id.
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suffered by the public utility would have to be made up through
higher rates charged “to the remaining residential, commercial and
smaller industrial customers, who are not in a position to install
turbine generators and purchase generation steam.”100
The reasoning in National Spinning, with the Utilities
Commission focusing on potential cost increases to consumers not
able to receive service from an unregulated provider, is very similar to
the basis for the decision by the court in Simpson. And as with
Simpson, where the unregulated provider served forty-five percent of
the market for two-way radio service in Cleveland County,101 the scale
of the potential loss to the incumbent electric utility in National
Spinning may have influenced the decision in the case. In deciding to
prohibit the proposed arrangement, the Utilities Commission took
into account the prospect of losing such a significant customer as
National Spinning, which purchased $3 million in electricity from
CP&L annually, and the accompanying loss of investment by the
utility in the infrastructure necessary to serve the consumer.102
C.

Progress Solar Investments, LLC (2009)

In Progress Solar Investments, LLC,103 the Utilities Commission
held that the sale of solar powered lighting did not render the seller a
public utility.104 Progress Solar Investments, LLC (“PSI”) proposed to
“install and maintain solar LED lighting systems to provide light in
user-designated areas.”105 The lighting systems were completely selfcontained, meaning that PSI did not need electricity from the grid to
power the lighting systems, but instead planned to generate its own
electricity through an on-site solar PV system.106
The argument for treating PSI as a public utility was based
primarily on the statutory definition, which, as previously discussed,
provides that a public utility is “a person . . . now or hereafter owning
or operating in this State equipment or facilities for . . . [p]roducing,
generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing electricity, piped
gas, steam or any other like agency for the production of light, heat or

100. Id.
101. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757
(1978).
102. See Nat’l Spinning, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7, 1996 WL 252627.
103. Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 525 (N.C. Utils.
Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406.
104. Id. at 4, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 528.
105. Id. at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 526.
106. Id.
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power to or for the public for compensation.”107 Despite the fact that
PSI planned to own and operate solar electricity-generating
equipment on the customer’s property “for the production of light[,]”
the Commission determined PSI was not a public utility.108 The
Commission explained this result as follows:
The use of solar resources to provide lighting as proposed by
PSI is consistent with the recently enacted policy of the State to
promote the development of renewable resources. PSI will not
be holding itself out to provide solar lighting to the general
public, and the lighting will be provided only as a result of
bargained for transactions and pursuant to agreed-upon terms
and conditions. Unlike steam and piped gas, the light produced
by the solar lighting systems cannot be used to generate
electricity and thus be used indirectly to bypass the electric
utilities’ exclusive franchises.109
The Utilities Commission’s reasoning regarding the potential
impact (or lack thereof) on the electric utilities’ exclusive franchises
seems questionable. It is true that the end consumer could not use the
light produced by PSI to generate electricity.110 Even so, the light
purchased by the consumer existed only due to the electricity
generated by PSI’s on-site solar PV system, rather than because of
electricity generated and sold by the incumbent electric utility.111
Consequently, despite the Utilities Commission’s statement
otherwise, the arrangement under review indirectly bypassed the
public utility’s exclusive franchise on the sale of electricity.
D. FLS YK Farm, LLC (2009)
In FLS YK Farm, LLC,112 the Commission considered whether
the provision of hot water by one party to another through the use of
solar thermal panels rendered the first party a public utility. The
Commission concluded that
the sale of BTUs [British Thermal Units] by the owner or
operator of solar thermal panels located on-site to a single
entity pursuant to a “bargained for” transaction for the purpose
107. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
108. Progress Solar, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 2, 4, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
at 527–28, 2009 WL 4197406.
109. Id. at 3, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 528.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1–2, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 526.
112. Docket No. RET-4, SUB 0 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 2009), 2009 WL
1106526.

95 N.C. L. REV. 1599 (2017)

2017]

SOLAR FINANCING IN N.C.

1621

of heating water for the entity’s on-site use does not constitute
the provision of utility service to or for the public and,
therefore, such an owner or operator would not fall within the
[statutory] definition of a public utility.113
The reasons cited by the Commission for reaching this result
included: the existence of a bargained-for agreement between a single
provider and a single customer; the fact that the heated water would
be used on-site; and the public policy considerations that had recently
been articulated by the General Assembly.114 Those public policy
considerations, taken directly from the REPS requirement enacted by
the General Assembly in 2007, were “to promote the development of
renewable energy for the purposes of diversifying the State’s energy
resources, providing greater energy security through the use of
indigenous resources, encouraging private investment in renewable
energy, and improving air quality.”115 The fact that the Utilities
Commission cited the policy goals set forth in the REPS requirement
in the context of an agreement between two private parties indicates
that those goals apply not just to the investor-owned utilities that are
expressly subject to the requirement, but also to consumers of
electricity in the State.
The Commission explicitly noted in the FLS YK Farm decision
that the solar-thermal energy facility would not generate any
electricity, and that the “output of the solar panels [would] be used
solely to heat water belonging to [the customer], which [would] then
use the hot water for its on-site domestic needs.”116 This decision,
along with Progress Solar, came shortly after the General Assembly
enacted a statutory policy statement supporting the increased use of
renewable energy in the State.117 Therefore, FLS YK Farm and
Progress Solar seemed to signal a more permissive approach than the
Utilities Commission had taken in National Spinning, which focused
on protecting the competitive monopoly granted to electric utilities
and preventing cost increases to other consumers rather than on
environmental considerations.118

113. Id. at 3, 2009 WL 1106526, at *3.
114. Id. at 2, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2.
115. Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(10) (2015) (using nearly identical language
to describe North Carolina energy policy).
116. FLS YK Farm, Docket No. RET-4, SUB 0, at 1, 2009 WL 1106526, at *1.
117. Id. at 2, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2.
118. Although the Utilities Commission in FLS YK Farm states that its decision
“should not be regarded as a precedent for any activity other than the activity involved in
this case,” the ruling is instructive as to how the Commission has considered the issue of
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W.E. Partners I, LLC (2012)

W.E. Partners I, LLC119 addressed a peculiar situation in which
one company planned to give excess electricity generated to a second
company.120 The electricity-generating company hoped that giving the
electricity away for free would prevent it from coming within the
definition of “public utility[,]” which requires that a person “deliver
or furnish electricity . . . to or for the public for compensation.”121
Despite this attempt to avoid the plain language of the statute, the
Utilities Commission held that the electricity-producing company
would still be considered a public utility.122 The Commission noted
that the two parties involved had business dealings, other than the
proposed donation of electricity from one to the other.123 The
Commission stated that “it would be impossible for the Commission
to identify if compensation for electricity provided ‘free of charge’
could exist in other financial agreements between an electric
generator and a third party.”124 In other words, while the electricity
might be provided for free, the parties could hide payments for the
electricity in the pricing of other transactions between them. As
summarized by the Commission:
Were the Commission to rule otherwise [and allow the
provision of “free” electricity from one party to another] it
would open a Pandora’s box of scenarios in which an electric
generator could provide electrical services “free of charge” to a
third party and build in compensation to recover its costs via
other arrangements, thus, avoiding the statutory definition of a
public utility.125
Thus, despite the parties’ efforts to avoid the statutory language
regarding the provision of electricity “for compensation[,]” the
Utilities Commission held that the electricity-generating company
would be regulated as a public utility under the proposed
arrangement.126 Given how peculiar such an arrangement would be,

whether certain activity implicates the jurisdiction of the Commission under the definition
of a “public utility.” Id. at 3, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2.
119. Docket No. SP-729, SUB 1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Sept. 17, 2012), 2012 WL
4320931.
120. Id. at 2.
121. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015) (emphasis added).
122. W.E. Partners I, Docket No. SP-729, SUB 1, at 4, 2012 WL 4320931.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See id. at 5.
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this decision illustrates the Commission’s protectiveness of the
competitive monopoly granted to electric utilities.
F.

NC GreenPower (2015)

The Utilities Commission in NC GreenPower127 approved two
pilot programs that sought to increase access to renewable energy
sources for schools and non-profit organizations.128
In its Order approving the pilot programs, the Commission
stated that
The Commission disagrees with [one of the commenters on the
proposed pilot programs] that Chapter 62 [the Public Utilities
Act] allows for power purchase agreements between utility
customers and non-utility solar installers. Rather, the
Commission concludes that Chapter 62 of the North Carolina
General Statutes prohibits third-party sales of electricity by
non-utility solar installers to retail customers.129
The Commission did not, however, provide any discussion or
analysis about how it reached this conclusion.130
G. Analysis of Pre-NC WARN Decisions
These pre-NC WARN decisions by the North Carolina Utilities
Commission prove difficult to reconcile. First, several of the
decisions, including Natural Power, W.E. Partners, and NC
GreenPower, failed to mention Simpson at all and therefore did not
expressly apply any of the “regulatory circumstances” listed in
Simpson.131 Another decision, FLS YK Farm, mentioned Simpson and
the “regulatory circumstances[,]” but then did not discuss any of those
circumstances in the Commission’s analysis.132
Some of the decisions gave attention to the issue of whether the
arrangement subject to review was “bargained for,” or specifically
negotiated, between the parties. In Natural Power, Progress Solar,
and FLS YK Farm, this factor seemed influential in the Commission’s
conclusion that the arrangement in question did not constitute an
127. Docket No. E-100, SUB 90 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 27, 2015), 2015 WL 399728.
128. Id. at 4, 2015 WL 399728, at *3.
129. Id. at 3, 2015 WL 399728, at *3.
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., W.E. Partners I, Docket No. SP-729, SUB 1, at 3–5, 2012 WL 4320931
(discussing the statutory definition of a “public utility” and impact of the proposal on
existing utilities, rather than the Simpson factors).
132. See FLS YK Farm, LLC, Docket No. RET-4, SUB 0, at 2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n
Apr. 22, 2009), 2009 WL 1106526, at *2.
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offer of utility services “to or for the public.”133 The focus on the
individualized nature of the arrangements has a logical basis, even
though Simpson made no specific mention of this, as the more
particularized the arrangement between parties the more it would
appear to be a private transaction rather than an offering “to or for
the public.”134 On the other hand, the arrangements under review in
National Spinning and W.E. Partners were specifically bargained-for
transactions and the Commission still found them to come within the
jurisdiction of the Commission as offers “to or for the public.”135
Therefore, the individualized, specially-negotiated nature of the
transaction between parties is cited and deemed relevant by the
Commission in some cases, but has not been determinative.
Also discussed in two of the decisions was whether the party
receiving the service in question would remain a customer of the
incumbent public utility. This is at least indirectly relevant to one of
the “regulatory circumstances” enumerated by the court in Simpson:
the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from regulation of one or
more persons engaged in the industry.”136 Logically, the competitive
effect on the incumbent public utility is mitigated if the recipient of
the service in question from an unregulated entity remains a customer
of the regulated, public utility. In Natural Power, for example, the
Commission specifically noted that Ajinomoto would remain
dependent on the incumbent utility for the balance of its steam needs,
despite the proposed arrangement with Natural Power.137 This
circumstance factored into the Commission’s decision that Natural
Power should not be regulated as a public utility.138
However, remaining a customer of the incumbent public utility
does not ensure a finding that the arrangement will avoid regulation
by the Utilities Commission, as illustrated by Commission’s decision
in National Spinning. In that case, the Commission specifically noted
that National Spinning’s electricity needs would not be met

133. See, e.g., id. at 3, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 623(23)(a)(1) (2015) (containing the underlying definition of utility services being offered
“to or for the public”).
134. See FLS YK Farm, Docket No. RET-4, SUB 0, at 2–3, 2009 WL 1106526, at *2
(holding that specific arrangement for provision of heat in a bargained for transaction did
not meet the definition of a public utility).
135. See supra Sections III.B, III.E.
136. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756
(1978).
137. Nat. Power, Inc., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 1, 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 340,
343 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 391223.
138. Id.
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completely through the arrangement with Leary, and that National
Spinning planned to remain connected to the electric grid.139
Nevertheless, the Commission found Leary to be a public utility
because of the potential negative competitive effects on the
incumbent utility that could have resulted from Leary providing some
portion of National Spinning’s electricity needs.140 It is important to
note that National Spinning had averaged $3 million annually in
electricity purchases from the public utility.141 As a result, even if
National Spinning remained dependent on some level of service from
the public utility, the potential loss of business by the public utility
with respect to this one customer was significant.
Perhaps the most perplexing of the pre-NC WARN decisions is
Progress Solar. In that case, PSI proposed using a solar PV system to
produce electricity, which would then be used to generate light that
PSI planned to sell to the customer.142 While the arrangement in
question was a “bargained for” transaction and the customer would
remain connected to the electric grid since the arrangement would
provide only for lighting needs in a parking lot owned by the
customer, the Commission found PSI not to come within the
definition of a public utility primarily because of the General
Assembly’s recently-enacted public policy statements favoring
renewable resources.143 This deference for arrangements promoting
renewable resources was again discussed in FLS YK Farm, decided
the same year as Progress Solar, but was not even mentioned in the
Commission’s subsequent W.E. Partners and NC GreenPower
decisions.144
The Commission in Progress Solar also relied on the curious
contention that “the light produced by the solar lighting systems
cannot be used to generate electricity and thus be used indirectly to
bypass the electric utilities’ exclusive franchises.”145 As noted earlier,
this contention fails to recognize that the solar lighting system was
powered by electricity produced by Progress Solar, rather than by the
electric utility, and therefore did in fact “indirectly . . . bypass the
139. Nat’l Spinning Co., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 3 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22,
1996), 1996 WL 252627.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.
142. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 525, 526 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406.
143. Id. at 3, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 528.
144. See supra Sections III.C–F.
145. Progress Solar, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 2, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
at 527, 2009 WL 4197406.
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electric utilities’ exclusive franchises.”146 The key factor in the
Progress Solar decision, then, may well have been that the
arrangement involved the production of electricity for a very limited
purpose—to power environmentally-friendly lighting rather than for
the general use of the customer. Very likely, the Commission saw this
as such an uncommon arrangement that it did not present a
significant competitive threat to the monopolistic position enjoyed by
the public utility.
While these pre-NC WARN decisions by the Utilities
Commission are difficult to reconcile, two lessons can be drawn from
them that make the Commission’s ultimate rejection of third-party
financing in NC WARN more understandable. First, the decisions hint
at different treatment for electricity than for other utility services
(such as steam or natural gas). In Natural Power, for example, the
Commission noted that the “end product” of the proposed
arrangement was steam, which “has not been regulated to the same
degree” as electricity.147 In FLS YK Farms, the Commission found
relevant that the “output of the solar panels [would] be used solely to
heat water belonging to [the customer],” and specifically noted that
the output would not be used to generate electricity.148 Finally, the
puzzling statement by the Commission in Progress Solar, that
“[u]nlike steam or piped gas, the light produced by the solar lighting
systems” at issue in that case could not be used to “generate
electricity,” demonstrates that arrangements involving the generation
of electricity receive heightened scrutiny from the Utilities
Commission.149 Though not expressly stated in any of these decisions,
the more rigorous regulation of electricity may be connected back to
one of the “regulatory circumstances” enumerated in Simpson, the
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated.”150 The importance of
uninterrupted electric service to the welfare of both individuals and
the economy serves as potential justification for the regulation (and
resultant prohibition) of any arrangement that might disrupt the
regulated electric industry.

146. Id.
147. Nat. Power, Inc., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 1, 99 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 340,
342 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Dec. 22, 1988), 1988 WL 391223.
148. FLS YK Farm, LLC, Docket No. RET-4, SUB 0, at 1 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr.
22, 2009), 2009 WL 1106526, at *1.
149. Progress Solar, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 3, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
at 528, 2009 WL 4197406.
150. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756
(1978).
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A second, related lesson that may be distilled from the pre-NC
WARN decisions is the strong protection from competitive pressures
granted by the Utilities Commission to electric utilities. A minimal
degree of competition for electric utilities appears to be acceptable to
the Commission, but anything beyond this is prohibited. For example,
the displacement of demand for electricity produced by the
incumbent utility was deemed acceptable in Progress Solar, where the
Commission approved the generation of electricity by a party selling
eco-friendly lighting to a customer.151 However, the Commission
deemed a more significant reduction in demand for electricity
produced by the public utility unacceptable in National Spinning.152
There the Commission expressed concern that allowing “unregulated
electric suppliers” to “cherry pick” large industrial customers would
upset the bargain at the heart of utilities regulation—namely, that
public utilities must serve all customers in a designated geographic
area and in exchange are granted a competitive monopoly in that
area.153
In National Spinning the Commission specifically mentioned its
concern over increased costs that could result for consumers who
would not be able to receive service from “unregulated electric
suppliers.”154 Those increased costs would result, however, only if the
Commission, which sets the price for electric service, seeks to
maintain a consistent rate of return for the regulated utility.155 So it
appears from the pre-NC WARN decisions that some minimal degree
of competition for regulated utilities is acceptable, but more than that
is not allowed.
Furthermore, the degree of acceptable competition may differ
from industry to industry. Going back to Simpson, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina held that an unregulated, two-way radio service
151. Progress Solar, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 4, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
at 528, 2009 WL 4197406.
152. Nat’l Spinning Co., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22,
1996), 1996 WL 252627.
153. Id. This same “cherry picking” concern was expressed by the Florida Supreme
Court in its decision to prohibit PPAs. PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 283
(Fla. 1988) (stating that if unregulated sales of electricity were permitted, nothing would
prevent “one utility company from forming a subsidiary and raiding large industrial clients
within areas served by another utility”). As a result of the decision in PW Ventures,
Florida, known as the “Sunshine State,” has ironically restricted the spread of distributed
solar PV systems by prohibiting PPAs. See id. at 283–84.
154. Nat’l Spinning, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7, 1996 WL 252627.
155. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 62-130(a), -133(b)(4) (2015) (establishing the Utilities
Commission’s rate-setting power and directing the commission to consider rate of return
in rate setting).
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that took approximately “45 [percent] of the available market” was
too much competition to avoid regulation.156 Given the significant
protection afforded by the Commission to the electric industry and
the relative importance of that industry to the overall economy of the
State (as compared to the two-way radio service at issue in Simpson),
it would understandably take less competition before the Commission
would intervene and deem a potential competitor to be a “public
utility” in the context of providing electricity.157
Again, though not expressly discussed in the pre-NC WARN
decisions, this theme of allowing some, but not too much, competition
relates back to one of the “regulatory circumstances” noted in
Simpson: the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from regulation
of one or more persons engaged in the industry.”158 In National
Spinning, the Commission signaled that a degree of competition that
may adversely impact the utility (by causing a loss from infrastructure
investment) and other consumers (by increasing the cost of
electricity) should result in regulation.159 On the other hand, the
minimal degree of competition involved in Progress Solar, where the
electric utility would lose business only when consumers opted for
eco-friendly parking lot lighting, was apparently insignificant enough
to avoid regulation.160 A company proposing a transaction with the
potential of creating more than minimal competition with the
incumbent electric utility, however, risks characterization as a public
utility by the Utilities Commission. This concern over competition
seems, at least implicitly, to constitute the basis for the Utilities
Commission’s decision in NC WARN, as described in the next Part.
IV. THE UTILITIES COMMISSION’S DECISION IN NC WARN
The Utilities Commission opinions described above led to the
Commission’s April 2016 decision in NC WARN to prohibit the use of
156. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 525, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757
(1978).
157. By way of comparison with the percentage of the market taken by Dr. Simpson in
the Simpson decision, a 2008 National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) analysis
estimated that only about twenty-two percent of residential building roof areas in cooler
climates and twenty-seven percent of residential rooftops in warm/arid climates are
suitable for solar. PAUL DENHOLM & ROBERT MARGOLIS, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LAB., SUPPLY CURVES FOR ROOFTOP SOLAR PV-GENERATED ELECTRICITY FOR THE
UNITED STATES 4 (Nov. 2008), www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/44073.pdf [https://perma.cc
/49KQ-LZU9].
158. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
159. See Nat’l Spinning, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7, 1996 WL 252627.
160. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 4, 278 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 525, 528 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406.
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power purchase agreements in North Carolina.161 In NC WARN, the
Commission began its analysis by stating that “North Carolina by
statute does not permit retail electric competition.”162 According to
the Commission, this “prohibition is based on the economic principle
that provision of public utility service for compensation is a service
fixed with a public interest, and competition results in duplication of
investment, economic waste and inefficient service, and high rates.”163
The Commission stated that the North Carolina General Assembly
previously studied the possibility of opening the electric industry in
the State to competition, but decided to maintain the exclusive
territorial franchises based on the “calamitous” experience in
California when that state opened its electricity market to
competition.164 Thus, the Commission implicitly relied on the Simpson
factor of the “effect of non-regulation . . . of one or more persons
engaged in the industry”165 in concluding that “the NC WARN

161. The Utilities Commission did not specifically address the permissibility of solar
leases in the NC WARN decision, though invited to do so by one of the intervenors in the
case. See Opening Comments of the Energy Freedom Coalition of America, LLC at 14,
N.C. Waste Awareness and Reduction Network, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31 (N.C. Utils.
Comm’n Oct. 30, 2015) (“[W]here the owner retains title to the equipment through a lease
agreement and the customer has exclusive rights to enjoy the entire output of the system
based on the consideration of fixed monthly payments made to the system owner—and
not on consideration based on metered per kWh payments—the Commission should make
clear that such arrangements do not involve the third-party sale of metered electricity.”).
Some states have prohibited the use of PPAs but still allow solar leases. See Order
Establishing Docket to Investigate the Development and Implementation of Net Metering
Programs and Standards, Docket No. 2011-AD-2, at 18–19 (Miss. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Dec.
3, 2015), 2015 WL 8013234, at *11 (allowing solar lessees to participate in net metering,
but not extending net metering to PPAs); compare PW Ventures, Inc. v. Nichols, 533
So.2d 281, 282–83 (Fla. 1988) (prohibiting the use of PPAs in Florida) with FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. § 25-6.065(2)(a) (2017) (“The term ‘customer-owned renewable generation’
does not preclude the customer of record from contracting for the purchase, lease,
operation, or maintenance of an on-site renewable generation system with a third-party
under terms and conditions that do not include the retail purchase of electricity from the
third party.”).
162. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100,
SUB 31, at 19 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n April 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (“[t]he service area in Greensboro has been assigned
exclusively to Duke, and other service areas in North Carolina have been assigned
exclusively to other electric suppliers.”) (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.2 (2015)).
163. Id. at 19–20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (citing State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v.
Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 267 N.C. 257, 271, 148 S.E.2d 100, 111 (1966) for the proposition
that “nothing else appearing, the public is better served by a regulated monopoly than by
competing suppliers of the service”).
164. Id. at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20.
165. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756
(1978).
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program in this case constitutes service to the public and is thus
impermissible.”166
In addition, the Commission found NC WARN subject to
regulation based on the Commission’s interpretation of the statutory
language defining “public utility.” As previously explained, the
statutory definition contains an exception for self-generators, stating
that “the term ‘public utility’ shall not include persons who construct
or operate an electric generating facility, the primary purpose of
which facility is for such person’s own use and not for the primary
purpose of producing electricity . . . for sale to or for the public for
compensation.”167 The Utilities Commission reasoned that the
inclusion of this exception for self-generators, and the absence of any
similar exception for solar financiers, amounted to “a clear legislative
declaration that the provision of electric service for compensation to a
third party . . . is service to the public and proscribed as an
encroachment upon the certificated utility’s exclusive service
rights.”168
The Commission went on to state that it is within the exclusive
authority of the General Assembly—and not within the authority of
the Commission—to alter the policy of territorial franchises for the
sale of electric services.169 It also cited another public policy concern
in support of its decision to prohibit power purchase agreements, that
allowing such agreements “presents the real probability that the
public interest will not be well served as this will leave burdensome,
less profitable service to the regulated incumbent and result in higher
prices to the remaining customers for the service—the harm identified
by the Court in Simpson.”170 According to the Commission, allowing
third-party financing of solar PV systems would disturb the delicate
balance between profit and service that the exclusive franchise for
public utilities creates: “in exchange for their exclusive right to serve,
the incumbent providers have an obligation to provide service to all,
irrespective of the cost of doing so, at prices established through the
regulatory, not the competitive, process.”171

166. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015).
168. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
169. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21.
170. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *22.
171. Id.
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Finally, the Commission justified its prohibition against thirdparty financing of solar PV systems by questioning its necessity.172
After all, customer-owned solar PV systems are explicitly permitted
under the exception to the definition of “public utility.”173 According
to the Commission, “[i]t is unclear why NC WARN seeks to sell
electricity to the Church rather than providing financing to the
Church to be repaid through the savings NC WARN represents will
be achieved from the electricity the PV facilities will generate.”174 The
Commission explained that because NC WARN and Faith
Community Church are both non-profit, tax-exempt organizations,
there did not appear to be a tax justification for why NC WARN
would need to retain ownership of the solar PV system, rather than
simply providing financing for the church to purchase the system itself
and thereby come within the self-generator exception.175
A. Analysis of the NC WARN Decision
Given the strong protection from competition granted to electric
utilities under the pre-NC WARN decisions,176 as well as the
conclusory statement in NC GreenPower that the North Carolina
statutes prohibit “third-party sales of electricity by non-utility solar
installers to retail customers[,]”177 it came as little surprise that the
Commission ruled against allowing power purchase agreements in NC
WARN. That said, there are several shortcomings to the
Commission’s decision.
First, the Commission failed to offer any explanation for how its
decision in NC WARN is consistent with its previous decisions. In
particular, the Commission provided no explanation for how the NC
WARN decision reconciles with the statutory declaration of public
policy favoring the use of renewable energy that the Commission
found so important in Progress Solar and FLS YK Farm.178 The
Commission in NC WARN did not even mention the proenvironmental public policy declarations enacted into statute by the

172. Id.
173. Id. at 21, 2016 WL 1572367, at *22 (noting “the ‘customer-owned’ generation
exception in G.S. 62-3(23)a.1”).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *23.
176. See supra Section III.G.
177. NC GreenPower, Docket No. E-100, SUB 90, at 3 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Jan. 27,
2015), 2015 WL 399728, at *3.
178. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 19–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–
23 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling); see also supra Sections III.C–D.
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General Assembly, apparently giving little or no weight to these
pronouncements.179
Moreover, the NC WARN decision is inconsistent with the
Commission’s previous decision to allow the sale of solar-powered
lighting in Progress Solar, given the fact that the arrangement in that
case displaced electricity sales that would have otherwise benefitted
the incumbent public utility.180 Though not discussed by the
Commission, one possible distinction between NC WARN and
Progress Solar is that the electricity produced in Progress Solar was
not actually sold to the customer.181 Instead, the electricity generated
by Progress Solar was used to produce light, and it was the light that
was then sold to the customer.182 Therefore, although Progress Solar
involved the generation and use of electricity by a party other than
the incumbent utility, the end product involved in that case was light,
not electricity.183 Another distinction between Progress Solar and NC
WARN may be the Commission’s belief about the potential
competitive impact of the activity involved in each case. The market
for solar-generated lighting considered in Progress Solar was much
narrower than the market for solar-generated electricity at issue in
NC WARN.184 Consequently, the Commission may have taken the
view that arrangements like the one in Progress Solar do not pose a
real competitive threat to the incumbent electric utility, while the
potential growth of solar PV systems if third-party financing were
allowed is much greater.
In addition to its failure to adequately distinguish its previous
decisions, the Utilities Commission in NC WARN relied on the same
“cherry picking” concern expressed by the court in Simpson, but
failed to provide any empirical data supporting that concern.185 As
explained by the Commission, allowing unregulated sales of
electricity through the use of power purchase agreements may result
in the regulated utility losing its most profitable customers to solar

179. See NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 19–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–
23 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (presenting other factors in deciding to regulate the
transaction at hand).
180. See supra Section III.C.
181. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR), 525, 526 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 2, 278 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) at 527.
185. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100,
SUB 31, at 21 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *22 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
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financiers.186 According to the Commission, “authorization of thirdparty sales presents the real probability that the public interest will
not be well served as this will leave burdensome, less profitable
service to the regulated incumbent and result in higher prices to the
remaining customers for the service.”187 However, the Commission
cited no specific evidence that allowing power purchase agreements
has such an effect. Unlike Simpson, where the unregulated offering of
two-way radio service had already taken forty-five percent of the
existing customer market from the incumbent utility, the
Commission’s decision in NC WARN was based solely on theoretical
speculation about the potential impact of allowing power purchase
agreements.188
Other states permit power purchase agreements, and those states
provide a natural testing ground for assessing the Utilities
Commission’s hypothesis. In a decision allowing power purchase
agreements,189 the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the potential
competitive impact of unregulated solar financiers on the incumbent
utility in the following terms:
If the third-party-PPA movement gets legs in Iowa, it is
conceivable that demand for electricity from traditional utilities
will be materially impacted in the long run. There is nothing in
the record of this administrative proceeding, however, to gauge
the likelihood or degree of material impact, and there was no
suggestion that the integrity of the grid or economic health of
regulated providers has been adversely affected in states such
as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, where thirdparty PPAs are not considered public utilities for purposes of
regulation.190
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 21–22, 2016 WL 1572367, at *21–22.
189. See infra Part V.
190. SZ Enters., LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 468 (Iowa 2014). Other states
have also allowed third-party ownership of solar PV systems. See, e.g., SolarCity Corp.,
Docket No. E-20690A-09-0346, Decision No. 71795, at 71 (Ariz. Corp. Comm’n July 12,
2010), 2010 WL 2864938 (noting that company’s offering of on-site facility service to
government and non-profit customers does not make it a public service corporation);
Powerlight Corp., Docket No. 02-0182, Decision & Order No. 20633, at 8 (Haw. Pub. Util.
Comm’n Nov. 13, 2003), 2003 WL 22966161; Investigation and Rulemaking to Adopt,
Amend, or Repeal Regulations Pertaining to Chapters 703 and 704 of the Nevada
Administrative Code, Docket Nos. 07-06024 & 07-06027, at 3–4 (Nev. Pub. Util. Comm’n
Nov. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 5159179, at *2; Declaratory Order Regarding Third-Party
Arrangements for Renewable Energy Generation, Case No. 09-00217-UT, at 13–14 (N.M.
Pub. Reg, Comm’n Dec. 17, 2009); Honeywell Int’l, Inc., Docket No. DR 40, Order No.
08-388, 1 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or. July 31, 2008), 2008 WL 3020892. But see Interpretive
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Thus, the Iowa Supreme Court did not rely on mere speculation
about the potential impact of PPAs on incumbent utilities, but instead
noted that no evidence had been presented about adverse effects on
utilities or the electricity markets in those states that have expressly
permitted PPAs.191
As for impact on consumers, the average retail price of electricity
over the last seven years in the states listed by the Iowa Supreme
Court as allowing PPAs192—Arizona,193 California,194 Colorado,195 and
Nevada196—compared to the national average price of electricity, is as
follows, listed in dollars per kWh:197
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010

Arizona
0.1040
0.1034
0.1018
0.1014
0.0981
0.0971
0.0969

California
0.1531
0.1542
0.1515
0.1430
0.1353
0.1305
0.1301

Colorado
0.0976
0.0994
0.1006
0.0988
0.0939
0.0939
0.0915

Nevada
0.0840
0.0948
0.0973
0.0903
0.0895
0.0897
0.0973

Nat’l Avg.
0.1028
0.1041
0.1044
0.1007
0.0984
0.0990
0.0983

Statement Concerning Jurisdiction and Regulation of Third-Party Owners of Net
Metering Facilities, Docket No. UE-112133, at 36 (Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm’n (July
30, 2014) (noting that the Commission may have limited jurisdiction over certain thirdparty solar companies, but that the determination is fact specific and that it would consider
a rulemaking to establish clear guidelines for limited regulation if the legislature did not
address the issue in 2015).
191. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 468.
192. Id.
193. The Arizona Corporation Commission determined in July 2010 that third-party
financing of solar PV systems did not render the solar financier a “public service
corporation.” See Solar City, Docket No. E-20690A-09-0346, Decision No. 71795, at 70,
2010 WL 2864938.
194. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 218(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 179 of 2017
Reg. Sess.).
195. See Renewable Energy Financing Act of 2009, ch. 157, § 11, 2009 Colo. Sess. Laws
673, 679–80 (2009).
196. The Nevada Public Utilities Commission concluded in 2008 “that third party
owners of net metered renewable energy systems is legal in Nevada.” See Investigation
and Rulemaking to Adopt, Amend, or Repeal Regulations Pertaining to Chapters 703 and
704 of the Nevada Administrative Code, Docket Nos. 07-06024 & 07-06027, at 3 (Nev.
Pub. Util. Comm’n Nov. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 5159179, at *2.
197. The table shows the average retail price for all sectors: residential, commercial,
industrial, transportation, and other. Electricity Data Browser, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.,
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/#/topic/7?agg=0,1&geo=g000000001i4&endsec=vg
&linechart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&columnchart=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&map
=ELEC.PRICE.US-ALL.A&freq=A&start=2001&end=2016&ctype=linechart&ltype=pin
&columnendpoints=1&rtype=s&pin=&rse=0&maptype=0 [https://perma.cc/7FN6-TMF9].
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The chart below shows the percentage change in the average
retail price for one kilowatt of electricity in each of these states from
2010 to 2016, as compared to the national average percentage change
over the same period:198

% change

Arizona
7.33

California
17.68

Colorado
6.67

Nevada
-13.67

Nat’l Avg.
4.58

Thus, two of the states that have permitted power purchase
agreements, Arizona and Colorado, experienced price increases in
the retail cost of electricity slightly greater than the national average
of 4.5%. Nevada saw a significant price decrease, and California saw a
significant price increase. California’s price increase has been linked
in academic literature to the price of natural gas and other factors
such as enactment of a renewable portfolio standard that requires
fifty percent of the state’s electricity to come from renewable sources
by 2030.199 Therefore, the price increase in California is much more
likely to have resulted from factors other than the fact that power
purchase agreements are permitted in the state.
In any event, the North Carolina Utilities Commission cited no
empirical data in support of its concern over the potential competitive
and price impacts that might result from allowing PPAs.200 Rather, in
support of its position that allowing PPAs would have a detrimental
impact on public utilities and consumers, the Commission cited to an
old study prepared by the General Assembly Study Commission on
the Future of Electric Service in North Carolina, which considered

198. Id.
199. See JONATHAN COOK, THE FUTURE OF ELECTRICTY PRICES IN CALIFORNIA:
UNDERSTANDING MARKET DRIVERS AND FORECASTING PRICES TO 2040 4–5 (2013),
https://eec.ucdavis.edu/files/02-06-2014-The-Future-of-Electricity-Prices-in-California
-Final-Draft-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2KE-4MQH]; see also Renewables Portfolio Standard
(RPS), CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/portfolio/ [https://perma.cc
/WST3-JVNV] (setting forth the history of California’s renewable portfolio standard
requirements).
200. See N. C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP100, SUB 31 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367 (Order Issuing
Declaratory Ruling). The NC WARN decision does cite to a series of back-and-forth
letters to the editor of Public Utilities Fortnightly, in which utilities executives and
academics argue over the cost-shifting caused by net metering. See id. at 26 n.23, 2016 WL
1572367, at *27 n.23. That part of the decision simply acknowledges that debate about the
value of solar exists, but does not consider any empirical data about the actual
consequences of allowing power purchase agreements. Id.
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the much broader question of whether to deregulate the electricity
market in North Carolina.201
In addition, although the Commission cited to the “cherry
picking” rationale described by the court in Simpson,202 the market
for electricity is substantially different from the market for two-way
radio service at issue in Simpson. Unlike the twenty-two users of
communication services at issue in Simpson, the market for electricity
in any particular geographic area is the entire population of that
area.203 From that population, only a limited number of consumers
will have the potential to use solar PV-generated electricity, given
that some locations are unsuitable for the service due to a lack of
direct sunlight or shared roof space, such as in an apartment
complex.204 Moreover, practically all those who may be able to use
solar PV-generated electricity will remain connected to the regulated
electric grid, since very few consumers are able to satisfy all of their
electricity needs exclusively through solar PV systems.205 Thus, while
the Commission acknowledged the differences between the two-way
radio market in Simpson and the market for electric service at issue in
NC WARN,206 it did not explain why it chose to ignore those
differences in reaching its conclusion that allowing PPAs would have
a detrimental impact on both the public utility and its consumers.
201. See id. at 20 n.8, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20 n.8; see also STUDY COMMISSION ON
THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC SERVICE IN NORTH CAROLINA, REPORT TO THE 1999
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 2000 REGULAR SESSION 1–2 (2000),
http://digital.ncdcr.gov/cdm/ref/collection/p249901coll22/id/192853 [https://perma.cc/6UKQFCTC] (“[T]he Commission has organized its work by viewing its charge as determining
whether or not regulation of retail service of electricity should be changed in North
Carolina to allow retail competition.”). The Study Commission recommended that “North
Carolina make a commitment to enter the world of competitive retail electric service, with
full retail choice of generation suppliers being available to all customers, on January 1,
2006.” Id. at 3. Ultimately, however, the recommendation of the Study Commission was
not followed due to concerns over the effects of deregulation in California. See Electric
Industry Restructuring, N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, http://www.ncuc.commerce.state.nc.us/electric
/elecrest.htm [https://perma.cc/JX33-W96S].
202. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 525, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757
(1978).
203. See id. at 525, 246 S.E.2d at 757 (describing the extremely limited market for twoway radio services in Cleveland County, North Carolina).
204. As previously stated, a 2008 National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL)
analysis estimated that only 1 in 5 residential roofs are likely to be suitable for solar
systems. DENHOLM & MARGOLIS, supra note 157, at 4.
205. This is due to the fact that the production of electricity through a solar PV system
is variable on weather and ceases outside of daylight hours. See Solar, INST. FOR ENERGY
RES., http://instituteforenergyresearch.org/topics/encyclopedia/solar/ [https://perma.cc/X72VRP5Y].
206. NC WARN, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 31, at 20 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15,
2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *20–21 (Order Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
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Finally, although the Commission did not address the
“regulatory circumstances” from Simpson explicitly, the protective
approach that the Commission took toward the incumbent utility is
presumably based, at least in part, on one of these circumstances: the
“nature of the industry.”207 The stability of the electric industry is
essential to economic advancement, and therefore the Commission
understandably proceeds with due care when considering changes
that might affect the industry. That said, the statement by the Utilities
Commission in NC WARN that “North Carolina by statute does not
permit retail electric competition”208 appears to prohibit any activity
that would potentially impact the incumbent utilities’ competitive
monopoly, even if that activity furthers the General Assembly’s
stated goals of using the “entire spectrum of demand-side options” to
assure the “facilities necessary to meet future growth” and the goal of
“diversify[ing] the resources used to reliably meet the energy needs of
consumers in the State.”209 The Utilities Commission’s overly
protective approach prohibiting any competition for the public
utilities risks stifling innovation within the electric industry.
As mentioned earlier, other states have allowed innovations such
as third-party financing of solar PV systems without the adverse
consequences feared by the Utilities Commission. The following
section examines the 2014 decision by the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ
Enterprises, which allowed the use of power purchase agreements in
that state.
V. THE IOWA SUPREME COURT DECISION IN SZ ENTERPRISES, LLC
V. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD210
The arrangement at issue in SZ Enterprises, LLC v. Iowa Utilities
Board was very similar to the one between NC WARN and Faith
Community Church, but the analysis in the case illustrates a different
approach than the one taken by the North Carolina Utilities
Commission. SZ Enterprises, doing business under the name Eagle
Point Solar, agreed to install and maintain a PV solar electric
generating system on a building owned by the city of Dubuque.211
Dubuque sought to “develop renewable energy for the use of the
city[,]”212 consistent with “the policy of [the] state to encourage the
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id. at 18, 2016 WL 1572367, at *19.
Id. at 20, 2016 WL 1572367, at *20.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a) (2015).
850 N.W.2d 441 (Iowa 2014).
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 444.
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development of alternate energy production facilities . . . in order to
conserve [Iowa’s] finite and expensive resources and to provide for
their most efficient use.”213 Under the power purchase agreement
between Eagle Point and Dubuque, “[t]he city would purchase the
full electric output of Eagle Point’s solar power generation facility on
a per kWh basis, which escalated at a rate of three percent
annually.”214 The PPA also provided that Eagle Point would own any
renewable energy credits associated with the generation system, “but
would credit to the city one third of any revenues received from the
sale of those credits.”215
As with the arrangement between Faith Community Church and
NC WARN, the PV system owned and installed by Eagle Point for
the city of Dubuque “would be on the customer side of the electric
meter provided by the city’s electric utility, Interstate Power.”216 This
meant that “electricity generated by the system would not pass
through Interstate Power’s electric meter.”217 Moreover, the PV
system would not fulfill all of the electrical needs of the city building
where the system was to be located.218 Consequently, the building
“would remain connected to the electric grid and [the city would]
continue to purchase electric power from Interstate Power to meet its
remaining needs at the premises.”219
Confronting the Iowa Supreme Court was the issue of whether
the terms of the proposed PPA rendered Eagle Point a “public
utility” under Iowa law.220 If so, the “proposed arrangement with the
city would be an unlawful incursion into the exclusive service territory
of Interstate Power[,]” the city’s incumbent electric utility.221 In
213. Id. at 447 (citing IOWA CODE § 476.41 (West, Westlaw current with 2017 Reg.
Sess.).
214. Id. at 444.
215. Id. at 444–45.
216. Id. at 445.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. In addition, if the court determined Eagle Point not to be a public utility, it
would need to also consider whether the arrangement rendered Eagle Point an “electric
utility[,]” id., defined under Iowa law as “includ[ing] a public utility furnishing electricity
as defined in section 476.1 and a city utility as defined in section 390.1.” IOWA CODE
§ 476.22 (2017). After determining that Eagle Point was not a public utility, the SZ
Enterprises court also found that the company was not an electric utility. SZ Enters., 850
N.W.2d at 470.
221. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 445 (citing IOWA CODE § 476.25(3) (West, Westlaw
current with 2017 Reg. Sess.). Under the Iowa Code, “[a]n electric utility shall not serve or
offer to serve electric customers in an exclusive service area assigned to another electric
utility, nor shall an electric utility construct facilities to serve electric customers in an
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determining whether Eagle Point was a public utility, the court
started with the statutory definition, which, in language almost
identical to the equivalent North Carolina statute, defines “public
utility” as “any person, partnership, business association, or
corporation, domestic or foreign, owning or operating any facilities
for [among other things] furnishing . . . electricity to the public for
compensation.”222 Under Iowa law, a public utility that furnishes
electricity (in contrast to other regulated commodities or services such
as gas, water, or communication services) is further defined as an
“electric utility.”223 As previously stated, Iowa provides exclusive
territorial franchises for its electric utilities. As a result, just as in NC
WARN, the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises had to determine
whether Eagle Point would, under the PPA, own or operate any
facilities for furnishing electricity “to the public for compensation.”224
If so, this would be prohibited under the incumbent electric utility’s
exclusive territorial franchise.
In determining whether Eagle Point was offering to furnish
electricity “to the public,” the Iowa Supreme Court held that a
company may come within this phrase even though it does not
“directly or indirectly hold itself out as providing service to all
comers.”225 Rather, sales “to the public,” as that phrase has been
interpreted under Iowa law, means “sales to sufficient of the public to
clothe the operation with a public interest and does not mean
willingness to sell to each and every one of the public without
discrimination.”226 Whether a specific activity, like Eagle Point’s
furnishing of electricity to Dubuque (and future potential customers)
under the terms of a PPA, constituted sales “to sufficient of the public

exclusive serve area assigned to another electric utility.” IOWA CODE § 476.25(3). As
explained in the Iowa statutes, the exclusive-territory provision is designed “to encourage
the development of coordinated statewide electric service at retail, to eliminate or avoid
unnecessary duplication of electric utility facilities, and to promote economical, efficient,
and adequate electric service to the public.” Id. § 476.25.
222. IOWA CODE § 476.1(3) (emphasis added); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3 (2015).
223. IOWA CODE § 476.22.
224. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 460 (citing IOWA CODE § 476.1).
225. Id. at 454–55 (rejecting the “rigid test” used in a line of Colorado cases for
determining whether a service or good is offered “to the public”).
226. Id. at 455, 474 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa State Commerce Comm’n v. N. Nat.
Gas Co., 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968)). This is the same standard cited by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519,
524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1978). Rather than applying the same four “regulatory
circumstances” as the Simpson court, id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756–57, the Iowa Supreme
Court applied the eight factors identified in the Serv-Yu case, as discussed below. SZ
Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 447, 470.
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to clothe the operation with a public interest,”227 required the court to
“examine the facts of [the] particular transaction on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether the transaction cries out for public
regulation.”228 To undertake this examination, the SZ Enterprises
court stated that eight factors first set forth in an Arizona Supreme
Court decision, known as the Serv-Yu factors, “provide a reasoned
approach when considering the question of whether the activity
involved is sufficiently clothed with the public interest to justify
regulation.”229 In summary, the Iowa Supreme Court reasoned that
sales of electricity are “to the public” if the sales are “to sufficient of
the public to clothe the operation with a public interest,”230 which may
be assessed by applying the so-called Serv-Yu factors, first laid out by
the Arizona Supreme Court in Natural Gas Service Co. v. Serv-Yu
Cooperative, Inc.231
The Serv-Yu factors, as described by the Iowa Supreme Court in
SZ Enterprises, are: (1) “a pragmatic assessment of what is actually
happening in the transaction[;]”232 (2) whether the transaction is
dedicated to public use[;]233 (3) an examination of the purpose of the
entity involved in the transaction, as set forth in the entity’s articles of
incorporation[;]234 (4) whether the transaction amounts to “an
indispensable service that ordinarily cries out for public
regulation[;]”235 (5) whether the entity involved in the transaction is
“intending to monopolize the territory with a public service
commodity[;]”236 (6) whether the entity accepts “substantially all
requests for service[;]”237 (7) whether the entity instead reserves the
right to discriminate in whether or not to provide the service[;] and
(8) an examination of the “actual or potential competition” between
the entity providing the service and the public utility.238 In SZ
Enterprises, the Iowa Supreme Court proceeded through these factors
one-by-one and ultimately concluded that “the balance of factors
227. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 455.
228. Id. at 466.
229. Id. (citing Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop., Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 325–26 (Ariz.
1950)).
230. Id. at 455.
231. 219 P.2d 324 (Ariz. 1950).
232. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 466.
233. Id. at 467.
234. Id. at 458.
235. Id. at 467.
236. Id. at 448 (quoting Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop., Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 326
(Ariz. 1950)).
237. Id. (quoting Nat. Gas Serv. Co., 219 P.2d at 326).
238. Id. at 467.
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point away from a finding that the third-party PPA for a behind-themeter solar generation facility is sufficiently ‘clothed with the public
interest’ to trigger regulation.”239
While the SZ Enterprises court moved summarily through some
of the Serv-Yu factors,240 other factors received more extensive
consideration. With respect to the first factor, “a pragmatic
assessment of what is actually happening in the transaction[,]” the
court said that the PPA could be “characterized as a sale of electricity
or a method of financing a solar rooftop operation,” and that
“[n]either characterization is inaccurate.”241 Regardless of its
characterization, however, the court stated that “most importantly”
the transaction “is an arms-length transaction between a willing buyer
and a willing seller.”242 As such, “[t]here is no reason to suspect any
unusual potential for abuse[,]” which would have served as a
justification for regulation.243 Rather, the court stated that “[f]rom a
consumer protection standpoint, there is no reason to impose
regulation on this type of individualized and negotiated
transaction.”244 The court further stated in its discussion of the first
Serv-Yu factor that what was happening as a result of the PPA could
have been accomplished without legal controversy through selffinancing or through a “standard lease[,]” pursuant to which Eagle
Point would lease the solar PV system to the city and the city would
use the leased equipment to generate its own electricity.245
That the use of a solar PV system could be achieved through selffinancing or through one form of third-party financing (leasing the
system) but not through another (financing the same system through
a PPA) appears to have been too much for the SZ Enterprises court
to accept. Given the permissibility of a lease arrangement, the court
stated that “the actual issue here is not the supplying of electricity
through behind-the-meter solar facilities, but the method of
financing.”246 Consequently, the court ultimately treated a PPA as just
239. Id. at 468.
240. The third factor in particular did not receive consideration from the SZ
Enterprises court in their analysis. See id. at 466–68.
241. Id. at 466.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. According to the court, “the [Iowa Utilities Board] would not seek to regulate
behind-the-meter solar installations that are owned by the host or which operate pursuant
to a standard lease.” Id. The court also said that Eagle Point and the City of Dubuque had
in fact converted their PPA into a lease “in order to remove the shadow of the legal cloud
raised by this case.” Id. at 466 n.6.
246. Id. at 466.
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another method for consumers to reduce their dependence on electric
utilities, much like high-efficiency windows, insulation, and LED
lighting.247 Self-financed solar production is permitted; solar
production through a traditional lease arrangement is permitted (at
least in Iowa); and energy conservation measures such as those listed
above, all of which reduce consumption of utility-generated
electricity, are also permitted.248 That being the case, the court found
it difficult to justify prohibiting PPAs, the preferred financing method
for companies and individuals who cannot afford to self-finance or do
not want to assume the risk associated with a solar lease arrangement.
The court also discussed the fourth Serv-Yu factor, and
concluded that the commodity at issue in the case, on-site, solargenerated electricity, was “not an indispensable service that ordinarily
cries out for regulation.”249 The vast majority of solar customers
remain connected to the grid.250 This is an important point for two
reasons. First, unlike the situation with centralized electricitygenerating facilities of the type traditionally operated by public
utilities, if there is a failure of an on-site solar PV system the customer
continues to receive electricity through the grid system.251 The risk of
failure is limited to the individual PV system, rather than to a more
widespread segment of the electric grid. Second, unlike the traditional
public utility, which is often the only provider of an essential service,
“if Eagle Point decides not to engage in a transaction with a customer,
the customer is not left high and dry, but may seek another vendor
while continuing to be served by a regulated electric utility.”252
Consumers have traditionally been at a bargaining disadvantage vis-àvis public utilities because the consumers absolutely must have the
service provided by the public utility and the public utility is the
exclusive provider of that service.253 This justification for regulation
does not apply in the context of on-site solar PV systems since the
consumer’s need for the essential service is already met by the public
utility, and the use of an on-site solar PV system is instead a
discretionary decision by the system host.254
247. Id. at 467 (stating that the solar panel “installation is no more dedicated to public
use than the thermal windows or extra layers of insulation in the building itself”).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. (“All of Eagle Point’s customers remain connected to the public grid.”).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. (“There is simply nothing in the record to suggest that Eagle Point is a six
hundred pound economic gorilla that has cornered defenseless city leaders in Dubuque.”).
254. See infra Part VI.
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Finally, with respect to the last Serv-Yu factor, the “actual or
potential competition with other corporations whose business is
clothed with the public interest[,]”255 the court acknowledged that
“[i]f the third-party-PPA movement gets legs in Iowa, it is
conceivable that demand for electricity from traditional utilities will
be materially impacted in the long run.”256 This competition, and the
resulting price increase for consumers who may not be able to receive
service from the unregulated service provider, was the primary
rationale for the North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision in
Simpson, as well as the North Carolina Utilities Commission’s
decision in NC WARN. As stated in Simpson, “unregulated radio
services might focus on classes which are easier and more profitable
to serve. The result would be to leave burdensome, less profitable
service on the regulated portion resulting inevitably in higher prices
for the service.”257
As previously explained in the discussion of Simpson, however, a
statewide solar PV market is different in important ways from the
Cleveland County market for two-way radio service. The two-way
radio market at issue in Simpson was so small that the court could
point to the substantial impact that an unregulated provider of
communication services was already having on the market.258 In
contrast, the Utilities Commission in NC WARN cited and discussed
no empirical evidence of the effect that permitting PPAs would have
on the market for electricity. Despite having no such empirical
evidence, the North Carolina Utilities Commission chose to prohibit
PPAs.259 In contrast, the Iowa Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises
treated the lack of any evidence of a negative impact in states that
have allowed PPAs as offering “no suggestion that the integrity of the
grid or economic health of regulated providers has been adversely
affected” by the use of power purchase agreements.260
A. The SZ Enterprises Decision in Relation to NC WARN
Up to a point, North Carolina law and Iowa law track one
another in determining what activities result in a company being
255. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 458.
256. Id. at 468.
257. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 525, 246 S.E.2d 753, 757
(1978).
258. Id.
259. N.C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100,
SUB 31, at 30 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *31 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
260. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 468.
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treated as a “public utility.” The statutory language defining a public
utility is virtually identical in both states. North Carolina defines a
public utility as a “person . . . owning or operating in this State
equipment or facilities for . . . furnishing electricity . . . for the
production of light, heat or power to or for the public for
compensation”261; Iowa defines a public utility as “any person . . .
owning or operating any facilities . . . for furnishing electricity to the
public for compensation.”262 In addition, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in Simpson expressed agreement with an earlier Iowa
Supreme Court decision stating that the determination of what
constitutes a public utility requires some degree of flexibility and
should consider whether there are “sales to sufficient of the public to
clothe the operation with a public interest.”263 According to Simpson,
this “ad hoc” approach taken by the Iowa Supreme Court is the “type
of flexible interpretation that is necessary to comport legislative
purpose with the variable nature of modern technology.”264
The laws in North Carolina and Iowa diverge, however, in the
factors considered in assessing whether a certain activity renders the
entity performing that activity a public utility. North Carolina law
applies the four “regulatory circumstances” first set forth in Simpson;
Iowa law applies the eight Serv-Yu factors. Consideration of those
different sets of factors provides insight as to why the North Carolina
Utilities Commission and the Iowa Supreme Court reached different
conclusions about whether power purchase agreements trigger
regulation as a public utility.
The first regulatory circumstance identified by the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Simpson was the “nature of the industry
sought to be regulated.”265 The Serv-Yu factors do not include
anything comparable. Of course, the electric industry plays an
essential role in modern life, both at the individual level and at the
broader societal level. Our economy and our standard of living are
based on access to reliable and affordable electricity. Thus, the
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated,” when considering the
electric industry, is justifiably characterized as indispensable.266
261. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-3(23)(a)(1) (2015).
262. IOWA CODE § 476.1 (West, Westlaw current with 2017 Reg. Sess.).
263. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757 (quoting Iowa State Commerce
Comm’n. v. N. Nat. Gas Co., 161 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Iowa 1968)).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
266. The indispensability of electricity has been recognized for generations, as stated in
1932 by then candidate for President Franklin Roosevelt, “[e]lectricity is no longer a
luxury. It is a definite necessity.” Franklin Roosevelt, Presidential Candidate, Campaign
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It is important to note, however, that the Simpson case did not
involve an issue related to the electric industry, and therefore the
Supreme Court of North Carolina did not illustrate how to apply this
factor in the context of the electric industry. Subsequent Utilities
Commission decisions like National Spinning and W.E. Partners have
given a substantial degree of protective treatment to the electric
industry.267 These decisions signal a clear reluctance by the Utilities
Commission to allow activity that has even the potential to adversely
affect electric utilities, and the Utilities Commission can point to the
first Simpson factor, the “nature of the industry[,]” to justify this
extremely protective treatment.268 The Commission’s decisions have
not always expressly stated this rationale as the basis for the special
treatment given to the electric industry.
This protective approach for the electric industry, based on the
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated,” may have the effect
of slowing innovation in the electric industry.269 The attention given to
the “nature of the industry” also prevents the case-by-case assessment
for determining whether regulation that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina claimed to espouse in Simpson is appropriate. No matter
what the specific facts involved in a particular case, the nature of the
electric industry remains the same, essential to our way of life and our
economy, and consequently there will always be a justification for
regulating (i.e., preventing) proposed activities in the electric
industry.
In contrast, the Serv-Yu factors applied by the Iowa Supreme
Court in SZ Enterprises do not contain a factor that considers the
“nature of the industry sought to be regulated.” Instead, one of the
Serv-Yu factors, which does not have an analog under Simpson, seeks
to determine “[w]hat the corporation actually does.”270 This factor
examines the nature of the activity undertaken by the entity, rather
than the nature of the industry in which that entity acts. SZ
Enterprises illustrates this distinction. Ultimately, the court in SZ
Enterprises found that while Eagle Point was selling electricity to the
Address in Portland, Oregon on Public Utilities and Development of Hydro-Electric
Power (Sept. 21, 1932), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=88390 [https://perma.cc
/X4A3-V89T].
267. See W.E. Partners I, LLC, Docket No. SP-729, SUB 1, at 2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n
Sept. 17, 2012), 2012 WL 4320931; Nat’l Spinning Co., Docket No. SP-100, SUB 7, at 7
(N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 22, 1996), 1996 WL 252627.
268. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
269. Id.
270. SZ Enters. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 458 (listing the eight Serv-Yu
factors).
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City of Dubuque under the power purchase agreement, what the
company was really doing was providing a mechanism for the city to
finance a solar PV system.271 And although Eagle Point was operating
within the electric industry by providing financing for solar PV
systems, the nature of that industry itself was not relevant to the
determination of whether the particular activity engaged in by Eagle
Point should be regulated by the Iowa Utilities Board. What was
relevant (along with the other Serv-Yu factors) was that the sales of
electricity from Eagle Point to the City of Dubuque was simply
facilitating the city’s ability to afford a solar PV system.272 That, the
SZ Enterprises court found, did not weigh against regulation by the
Iowa Utilities Board.273
An advantage to the approach taken by the Iowa Supreme Court
in applying the Serv-Yu factors over the Simpson factors applied in
North Carolina is that the approach taken in Iowa allows for a greater
degree of innovation while still considering whether the proposed
activity will adversely affect the market in question. The Simpson
factors include the “effect of non-regulation or exemption from
regulation of one or more persons engaged in the industry.”274
Likewise, the Serv-Yu factors include the “[a]ctual or potential
competition with other corporations whose business is clothed with
the public interest.”275 Thus, both tests allow for the protection of the
market and the public utility operating in that market, but the North
Carolina approach unduly constrains developments in that market by
focusing on the general nature of the industry involved.
Despite the various shortcomings to the NC WARN decision
described in Part IV, it was arguably decided correctly by the Utilities
Commission in light of the controlling Simpson case, and specifically
in light of the first regulatory factor from Simpson. That said, whether
the result in NC WARN has a solid theoretical foundation is another
question. The next part examines the issue of whether PPAs should
trigger regulation based on fundamental policy considerations.
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS IN REGULATING SOLAR FINANCIERS
Whether one prefers the result reached by the Iowa Supreme
Court allowing power purchase agreements or the North Carolina
271. Id. at 466 (“[T]he actual issue here is not the supplying of electricity through
behind-the-meter solar facilities, but the method of financing.”).
272. See id. at 466–68.
273. Id.
274. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
275. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 458.
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Utilities Commission prohibiting them may well turn on one’s views
on the seriousness of climate change and the urgency for increasing
the use of clean energy to slow global warming. Differing views on
those issues may prove difficult to bridge, but the more general
question of when the Utilities Commission should exert its
jurisdictional authority may be considered separate from the context
of one’s views on climate change. Courts and policy-makers have
traditionally cited several policy reasons for regulating public utilities.
With respect to electric utilities, these policy reasons have typically
included: ensuring the reliable delivery of an essential commodity;
protecting consumers from high prices; and avoiding waste through
the unnecessary duplication of capital assets.276 As explained by the
National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
[r]etail electricity markets in the United States remain
regulated in most states in part to protect consumers (rates and
reliability) and to ensure a highly functioning electric grid. If
anyone could freely connect a generator to the existing grid, the
electricity supply could become volatile and unsafe, which
could cause congestion, blackouts, and maintenance concerns.
Additionally, regulation of these markets prevents unnecessary
duplication of assets such as transmission and distribution
facilities. Regulated investor-owned utilities are given
monopoly status in most service territories to prevent such
problems. By having a single entity control the system, a utility
can balance constantly changing supply and demand to ensure
reliability and keep the electricity flow on the grid optimized
and safe.277
These same justifications for regulation have been recognized by
various courts and administrative bodies. In SZ Enterprises, for
example, the Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that certain
commodities, such as electricity, “may be essential to commerce or
everyday life,” and therefore “the continued provision of the service
on a reliable basis may trigger a public interest” justifying
regulation.278 Similarly, the Missouri Public Service Commission has
explained the theoretical justifications for regulating utilities as
follows:

276. See KATHERINE KOLLINS, BETHANY SPEER, & KARLYNN CORY, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., SOLAR PV PROJECT FINANCING: REGULATORY AND
LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THIRD-PARTY PPA SYSTEM OWNERS 4 (Feb. 2010),
http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46723.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPX2-ZLZP].
277. Id.
278. SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 466.
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[T]o preserve and promote those services which are
indispensable to large segments of our population, and to
prevent excessive and discriminatory rates and inferior service
where the nature of the facilities used in providing the service
and the disparity in the relative bargaining power of a utility
ratepayer are such as to prevent the ratepayer from demanding
a high level of service at a fair price without the assistance of
governmental intervention in his behalf.279
The traditional rationales for regulating electric utilities do not
apply, however, to the provision of electricity under a power purchase
agreement. First, practically all consumers who install solar PV
systems remain connected to the electric grid.280 This may be due to
the variable and unpredictable production of electricity by solar PV
systems at any particular moment in time281 or due to the cap on the
amount of tax incentives available for the installation of a solar PV
system.282 Whatever the reason for not completely displacing the
consumer’s need for electricity from the grid, the electricity from a
solar PV system used by a consumer still connected to the grid should
be viewed as a cost-effective and environmentally-beneficial
supplement to grid-supplied electricity, rather than as the sole source
of an essential component of daily life.283 The consumer does not need
279. Geldbach Petroleum Co., Case No. 15490, 56 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 207, 213
(Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Oct. 13, 1964), 1964 WL 129905; see also Trico Elec. Coop., v.
Corp. Comm’n of Ariz., 339 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Ariz. 1959) (“The trial court was justified in
finding that convenience and necessity required its regulation to prevent competition with
public utilities under the principle of regulated monopolies to prevent waste and
duplication in service.”).
280. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18 (“Most residential systems rely on
the electricity grid (rather than a battery) to manage the mismatch between their
building’s load profile and their PV system’s generation profile, using net metering to
compensate them for electricity fed back into the grid.”).
281. Simply put, if the sun is not shining, the solar PV system is not generating
electricity. To hedge against “rainy days,” most consumers remain connected to the
traditional electric grid.
282. In North Carolina, for example, the state income tax credit for the purchase of a
solar PV system (before its expiration at the end of 2015) was capped at $10,500. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 105-129.16A(c)(2)(d) (2015); see also N.C. DEP’T OF REVENUE
GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING THE TAX CREDIT FOR INVESTING IN RENEWABLE
ENERGY PROPERTY 12 (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.dornc.com/taxes/corporate/renewable
_energy_credits.pdf [https://perma.cc/6TRD-N7AY]. Therefore, purchasers of solar PV
systems in North Carolina were economically motivated to limit the size (and therefore
the potential output) of the systems they purchased.
283. Some proponents of distributed solar have argued that because on-site solar PV
systems provide electricity on the “customer side” of the meter, meaning that the
customer consumes the electricity from the solar PV system before drawing any electricity
from the grid, these systems should be considered and treated equivalent to other energy
efficiency measures that operate to reduce the amount of electricity consumed from the
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to depend on the electricity produced by the solar PV system, since
electricity from the grid remains available at all times. Consequently,
while the provision of electricity through the grid is unquestionably
an indispensable service to the public, the decision to supplement
grid-supplied electricity with electricity from a solar PV system
amounts to a discretionary purchase by the consumer. This is, of
course, evidenced by the fact that a very small percentage of the
overall population receives electricity from on-site solar PV
systems.284 Thus, the traditional justification for regulating an
“indispensable service” does not apply to solar PV systems when the
consumer remains connected to the electric grid.
The second traditional justification for regulation, protection of
consumers from overpricing, is also inapplicable to solar PV systems.
Due to the high capital costs associated with generation, transmission,
and distribution of electricity to large numbers of consumers, and the
resulting barrier to competition resulting from these costs, electric
utilities have historically been considered natural monopolies.285 A
natural monopoly which sells a good or service essential to modern
life, like electricity, has disproportionate bargaining power relative to
individual consumers. The result of this disparity in bargaining power
is the potential for the natural monopoly to overprice the good or
service. Government regulation, and price regulation in particular,
has served as an effective check on this potential abuse in pricing.
That disparity in bargaining power and the resulting potential for
over-pricing does not apply to distributed solar, however, for several
reasons. These include the non-essential nature of on-site, solargenerated electricity; the lower cost of entry for suppliers in the
distributed solar market; and the competition within that market.
Because most users of distributed solar electricity remain connected
grid, such as high-efficiency bulbs or weather-proof windows. See SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d
at 467. The comparison to other energy saving measures breaks down, however, because
solar PV systems produce electricity, rather than just reducing the need for electricity. In
addition, solar PV systems have the potential to feed electricity into the grid, allowing for
the possibility of net metering. Feeding electricity into the grid implicates several
considerations that do not apply to other energy saving measures (such as safety,
compatibility, and economic issues). For further discussion, see NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., CONNECTING YOUR SOLAR ELECTRIC SYSTEM TO THE UTILITY GRID,
(July 2002), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy02osti/31687.pdf [https://perma.cc/BEG4-ZSK6].
284. The Solar Energy Industries Association estimates that the U.S. reached one
million solar installations nationwide in 2016. See Million Solar Strong, SOLAR ENERGY
INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/million-solar-strong [https://perma.cc/8HC6-7PEC].
285. See Douglas Gegax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Industry:
An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 75 (1993) (concluding that electric utilities are
multiproduct natural monopolies).
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to the grid, and even those who do not remain connected have the
option to do so, solar PV systems do not fit the natural monopoly
model. An individual consumer may choose to receive some, or even
all, of the consumer’s electricity needs from an on-site solar PV
system, but if that consumer elects otherwise or finds the cost of solargenerated electricity to be too high, the grid provides an available
source of electricity to meet the consumer’s needs. Put differently, the
decision to enter into a power purchase agreement is entirely elective,
unlike the decision to receive electric service generally.
In addition, relative to the exceptionally high cost of building
generating stations and systems for transmitting and distributing
electricity over a large area like public utilities do, the cost of entering
the on-site solar PV market is substantially lower. As evidenced by
the NC WARN case, a supplier of solar PV systems may enter the
market without the extensive capital necessary to construct largescale electric plants.286 Simply stated, distributed solar is not a natural
monopoly because of the availability of electricity from the grid and
the lower barrier to entry into the distributed solar market. This
lower barrier to entry allows for robust competition among solar PV
system suppliers, at least in states that allow attractive financing
options like power purchase agreements. Therefore, the potential for
overpricing is checked by the traditional grid, the lower barrier to
entry, and the resulting competition within the distributed solar
market.
The final traditional justification for regulation of utilities is the
avoidance of unnecessary and wasteful duplication of capital assets.
This also has no relevance when considering distributed solar PV
systems. Unlike a competing electric utility, which would have to
replicate a centralized generation facility, as well as the means for
transmission and distribution of the electricity, distributed solar is
located on-site and behind the meter of the consumer. There simply is
no duplication of the capital assets used by the incumbent electric
utility in producing and transmitting electricity. In fact, given that
excess electricity generated by distributed solar PV systems is fed
back into the grid through net metering programs, the regulated
utility’s capital assets may be more fully utilized with more distributed
solar PV systems in operation. Since solar production is at its peak on
286. See N. C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP100, SUB 31, at 2 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *2 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling) (explaining that NC WARN intended to use the revenue
stream from Faith Community Church to allow NC WARN “to install similar systems for
additional consumers”).
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sunny days, when demand for electricity is usually at its highest, the
feeding of excess electricity into the grid by distributed solar PV
systems may actually increase efficiency by reducing the need for the
construction of additional generation facilities by the regulated
utility.287
Thus, the three traditional justifications for regulating an
activity—ensuring reliable service, protecting consumers from overpricing, and avoiding waste—do not apply to the solar PV market.
Moreover, other policy considerations weigh in favor of allowing
PPAs. One such consideration is the security of the electric system
from external threats, particularly cyber-attack or terrorist threats.
Regulation of a centralized system of electricity generation,
transmission, and distribution is warranted, in part, to reduce the
vulnerability of the system from security risks. If the grid were to fail,
the public would suffer widespread economic hardship and
detrimental effects on the standard of living. Distributed solar does
not have that same vulnerability. On-site solar PV systems typically
serve a single consumer.288 Therefore, the failure of such a system is
far less significant than the type of system-wide failure possible with a
traditional electric utility. In addition, as previously discussed, most
solar PV system users remain connected to the electric grid.
Consequently, should a solar PV system fail, the user continues to
receive electricity through the grid, resulting in no loss of electricity
service for the user.
Equitable considerations also weigh in favor of allowing PPAs.
This is particularly the case in a state like North Carolina, which has a
generous net metering policy but prevents those without the
resources to purchase solar PV systems outright from taking
advantage of that policy. The cost of solar PV systems has decreased
significantly in the last five years.289 Even so, paying the upfront cost
287. As stated in a debate over net metering policy, additional benefits associated with
expanding distributed solar include: “excess electricity provided to the grid during peak
periods, reduced congestion on the distribution grid, deferred or eliminated new utility
investments in generation, transmission and distribution, improved system reliability, and
reduced risk from fuel-cost volatility.” See Charles J. Cicchetti & Jon Wellinghoff, Solar
Battle Lines: The Fight Over Customer Rooftops, Grid Funding, and Net Metering, 153 No.
12 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 18, 19 (Dec. 2015).
288. There is a recent trend, however, for states to allow “community” solar PV
systems. Under these arrangements, more than one consumer is served by the same local
solar PV system. For a description of community solar, see Community and Shared Solar,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, https://energy.gov/eere/sunshot/community-and-shared-solar
[https://perma.cc/YUK3-BMTV].
289. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory reports that the “median reported
U.S. residential system had a capacity of 6.1kW in 2014 and cost approximately $26,000—
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for a solar PV system is still beyond the reach of most Americans.
This is particularly the case for racial minorities, whose median
household income and overall wealth lags significantly behind
Americans as a whole.290 In general, lower income households have
not been able to take advantage of the reduced cost for solar PV
systems. As explained in a working paper by George Washington
University’s GW Solar Institute, “[t]he 49.1 million households that
earn less than $40,000 of income per year make up 40 percent of all
US households but only account for less than five percent of solar
installations.”291
Some commentators have speculated about the possibility of an
“electrical divide[,]” in which the wealthy benefit from the cost
savings of clean energy, while the less-well-off are left bearing the
burden of an antiquated and less reliable traditional grid system.292
While allowing third-party financing, such as power purchase
agreements, may not solve all of the equitable issues involved in
affording solar PV systems,293 it does allow greater access to
distributed solar generation for middle- and low-income Americans,
including members of minority groups.
The policy and equitable considerations discussed in this Part
indicate that the regulation of PPAs lacks a sound theoretical
foundation. Consequently, North Carolina law should permit the use

which is 40% less than the $44,000 a similarly sized system would have cost in 2010.”
FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18.
290. The national median household income was $53,657 in 2014 for all Americans, but
was lower for Latino ($42,491) and Black ($35,398) Americans. CARMEN DENAVASWALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2014, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 5, (Sept. 2015), www.census.gov/library/publications/2015
/demo/p60-252.html [https://perma.cc/5NXH-UZHY]; see also Rakesh Kochhar & Richard
Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great
Recession, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/47J9-6LR5].
291. James A. Mueller & Amit Ronen, Bridging the Solar Income Gap 2 (GW Solar
Institute, Working Paper, 2015), http://solar.gwu.edu/research/bridging-solar-income-gap
[https://perma.cc/YT78-G5L8].
292. See Richard W. Caperton & Mari Hernandez, The Electrical Divide: New Energy
Technologies and Avoiding an Electric Service Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 15,
2013), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/reports/2013/07/15/69249/the-electrical
-divide-new-energy-technologies-and-avoiding-an-electric-service-gap/ [https://perma.cc/FLV3XGGS] (discussing the possibility of a “utility death spiral” if only the wealthy are able to
afford solar PV systems).
293. See GRID ALTERNATIVES, VOTE SOLAR, & THE CTR. FOR SOC. INCLUSION,
LOW INCOME SOLAR POLICY GUIDE 8 (2016), http://www.lowincomesolar.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/03/Policy-Guide_3.7.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/64Y9-5ZJW] (discussing the
disparate effect of credit scores on access to solar through third-party financing
arrangements, including PPAs).
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of PPAs, which would allow for more ready access to distributed solar
for the average North Carolinian. In Part VII, this Article prescribes
possible judicial and statutory solutions to allow for the use of PPAs.
VII. PRESCRIPTIONS FOR SOLAR FINANCING IN NORTH
CAROLINA294
Given the lack of theoretical foundation for regulating solar
financiers, the NC WARN decision establishes an unjustified barrier
to the spread of distributed solar PV systems. That barrier may be
overcome, however, through action by either the General Assembly
or the Supreme Court of North Carolina.
Legislative action could render the NC WARN decision moot by
explicitly permitting third-party financing for solar PV systems in
North Carolina. This was proposed during the 2015 session of the
North Carolina General Assembly through House Bill 245, the
“Energy Freedom Act.”295 The Energy Freedom Act would have
amended the definition of a public utility to include a second
exception (in addition to the exception for self-financing) for “a
person who constructs or operates a renewable energy facility on the
site of a customer’s property and sells the electricity produced by such
facility to that customer, as provided by and subject to the limitations
of G.S. 62-119.”296 The referenced “limitations of G.S. 62-119” stated
that the third-party owner of the renewable energy facility (i.e., the
financier under a PPA) would not be treated as a public utility
so long as (i) the facility is sized to supply no more than one
hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the average annual
consumption of electricity by the customer at that site and (ii)
the third-party owner reports to the Utilities Commission the
proposed construction of such a facility prior to the beginning
of construction.297
The Energy Freedom Act was referred to a House committee
but did not emerge, as it faced opposition from the state’s electric
utilities.298 One modification that could make the proposed legislation
more palatable to its opponents, however, is a limitation not only on
the relative size of any on-site “renewable energy facility,” as the

294. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
295. H.B. 245, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Telephone Interview with John Szoka, Representative, N.C. Gen. Assembly (Jan.
3, 2017).
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Energy Freedom Act included with the 125% “limitation[] of G.S. 62119,”299 but also on the absolute size of the facility. In other words, the
legislation could cap the size of any solar PV system to a specified
number of kilowatts, if the system is owned by third-party financiers
rather than by the host property owner. Such a cap would effectively
limit the exception from the definition of “public utility” to
residential and smaller commercial and non-profit customers. This
would address the “cherry picking” concern identified in Simpson,
National Spinning, and NC WARN.300 By capping the absolute size of
the third-party financing exception in the definition of a public utility,
the General Assembly would ensure that public utilities would not
lose their largest customers or fail to make fair returns on
infrastructure investments built to serve those customers.
Since the median size of residential solar PV systems in the
United States is 6.1 kilowatts,301 a limit of 10 kilowatts would capture
most residential and smaller commercial systems. Changing the
proposed legislation to include such a cap could be accomplished by
simply modifying the “limitation[] of G.S. 62-119” to state that the
third-party owner of the renewable energy facility would not be
treated as a public utility “so long as (i) the facility is sized to supply
no more than (A) one hundred twenty-five percent (125%) of the
average annual consumption of electricity by the customer at that site
or (B) ten (10) kilowatts, whichever is smaller.” By adding this
limitation and addressing the “cherry picking” concern identified in
previous Supreme Court of North Carolina and Utilities Commission
decisions, the proposed legislation may be more acceptable to those
who opposed the previously-introduced Energy Freedom Act.
299. H.B. 245, Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2015).
300. This “cherry picking” concern has been identified in other contexts by courts and
regulators confronted with the issue of whether particular activity should result in an
entity being regulated as a public utility. See, e.g., Nat. Gas Serv. Co. v. Serv-Yu Coop.,
Inc., 219 P.2d 324, 328 (1950) (“What appellant seeks to do is to pick out certain industrial
consumers in select territory and serve them under special contracts to the exclusion of all
others except such private or domestic consumers as may suit its convenience and
advantage. There were other industrial consumers with whom the appellant refused or
failed to agree and so did not serve them. If such consumers were served at all, it must
necessarily be by a competitor. If a business so carried on may escape public regulation
then there would seem to be no valid reason why appellant may not extend the service to
double, triple, or many times the number now served without being amenable to
regulative measures.” (quoting Indus. Gas Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 21 N.E.2d
166, 168 (1939))). But see SW Gas Corp. v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 818 P.2d 714, 722–23
(1991) (rejecting the incumbent natural gas utility’s argument that El Paso Natural Gas
Company should be regulated as a “public service corporation” because it constituted a
competitive threat to the utility).
301. FELDMAN & BOLINGER, supra note 18, at 18.
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If a legislative fix is not possible, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina should reconsider the “regulatory circumstances” that it
introduced in Simpson. An opportunity for doing this may occur
through the appeal of the Utilities Commission’s NC WARN
decision.302 With the exception of the “effect of non-regulation or
exemption from regulation of one or more persons engaged in the
industry,”303 the regulatory circumstances from Simpson have
generally not been applied expressly in the decisions of the Utilities
Commission. As explained above, the Utilities Commission may have
implicitly taken into account the “nature of the industry sought to be
regulated,” since the Commission has generally provided greater
protection for the electric industry,304 but the attention given to this
regulatory circumstance prevents innovation in “essential”
industries305 and precludes the type of case-by-case analysis endorsed
by the court in Simpson.
In light of the factors actually considered by the Utilities
Commission in its previous decisions, statements by the court in
Simpson supporting the case-by-case approach, and factors
considered by courts in other jurisdictions when determining whether
to regulate an individual or entity as a public utility, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina should replace the regulatory circumstances
from Simpson with the following factors: (1) the nature of the
proposed transaction(s); (2) the impact on the public of regulation or
non-regulation; (3) the impact on the incumbent public utility of
regulation or non-regulation; and (4) declarations of public policy by
the General Assembly that may affect the decision of whether or not
to regulate the proposed transaction(s).
The first factor, the nature of the proposed transaction, shifts the
emphasis away from the nature of the industry (as called for by the
first “regulatory circumstance” set forth in Simpson),306 and instead
302. An appeal of the Utilities Commission’s NC WARN decision is currently pending
before the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See Danielle Battaglia, Court of Appeals
Hears Arguments on Nonprofit that is Selling Solar Energy to Greensboro Church, NEWS
& RECORD (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.greensboro.com/news/local_news/court-ofappeals-hears-arguments-on-nonprofit-that-is-selling/article_a05dcb76-2d31-5082-ba3b
-979b8e16c9af.html [https://perma.cc/TZ7W-XZ6Y]. The court will, of course, have to
follow the binding precedent set by Simpson. However, if the case is ultimately appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the court could reconsider the four regulatory
factors it enumerated in Simpson.
303. State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756
(1978).
304. See supra Section III.G.
305. See SZ Enters. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 466 (Iowa 2014).
306. Simpson, 295 N.C. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
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focuses attention on the transaction itself. Several aspects of the
proposed transaction may be relevant in determining whether the
Utilities Commission should step in to regulate. For example, with
respect to a power purchase agreement, this factor would consider
whether the PPA is intended as a means for selling electricity or
instead is meant to be a method for financing a solar PV system.307
This factor would also examine whether the proposed transaction
is “bargained for” between the parties, thereby indicating that the
parties have comparable bargaining power.308 If so, there is less need
for regulation based on concerns about consumer protection.
Analyzing the nature of the transaction would further allow for
consideration of issues such as (i) whether the proposed transaction
involves an indispensable commodity;309 (ii) whether the proposed
transaction will result in waste or duplication of resources;310 and (iii)
whether the consumer will continue to receive service from the
incumbent utility.311 All of these issues have been considered by the
North Carolina Utilities Commission, as well as other states’
regulators and courts, but are not part of the regulatory circumstances
listed in Simpson.
The second proposed factor, the impact on the public of
regulation or non-regulation of the proposed transaction, is intended
to focus attention on the fact that regulation of public utilities is
meant to serve the interest of consumers, not to ensure maximum
profit to the public utility.312 The North Carolina Utilities Commission
did address the impact of the proposed transaction on the public in its
NC WARN decision, but the Commission’s analysis was based on
theoretical speculation and empirical evidence about how PPAs affect
electricity pricing from states that have permitted PPAs was not
considered by the Commission in its assessment.
307. This aspect of the nature of the proposed transaction was discussed under the first
Serv-Yu factor in SZ Enterprises. See SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 466.
308. The issue of whether the proposed transaction was “bargained for” between the
parties was relevant to the North Carolina Utilities Commission in Natural Power and
FLS YK Farm, discussed above. See supra Sections III.A, III.D, III.G.
309. This is the first of the traditional justifications for regulation. See supra Part VI. It
is also the fourth Serv-Yu factor. See SZ Enters., 850 N.W.2d at 467 (discussing this factor
in the context of a power purchase agreement).
310. This is the third traditional justification for regulation. See supra Part VI.
311. Natural Power, National Spinning, and Progress Solar each note that the host
consumer would receive only a portion of its utilities needs from the proposed transactions
and would therefore remain customers of the incumbent utility. See supra Sections III.A–
C.
312. For a discussion of consumer protection as one of the three traditional
justifications for regulation, see supra Part VI.
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Further, while the Utilities Commission speculated in NC
WARN about the potential cost increases for those consumers who do
not enter into PPAs, the Commission ignored the very real economic
benefit that would be enjoyed by lower-income consumers, like Faith
Community Church, if they were allowed to enter into power
purchase agreements. The only certain price effect from the NC
WARN decision was that Faith Community Church will pay more for
its electricity because the PPA was struck down.
The third factor—impact of regulation or non-regulation on the
incumbent public utility—recognizes the “traditional regulatory
bargain” between public utilities and the state: public utilities
exchange the “benefit of monopoly franchised service territory for
[the] obligation to provide adequate service at reasonable rates.”313
The competitive monopoly granted to public utilities is not absolute,
however, as illustrated by the self-generation exception to the
definition of “public utility” in North Carolina and the Utilities
Commission’s allowance of the use of electricity generated by a third
party to produce lighting in its Progress Solar decision.314 Other state
regulators have been more explicit in recognizing that the competitive
monopoly offered to public utilities does not preclude all sales by
third parties.315 As discussed above, the North Carolina Utilities
Commission’s previous decisions seem to indicate that some—just not
too much—competition is permitted vis-à-vis public utilities.
Consistent with its analysis of the impact on consumers, the
Utilities Commission in NC WARN theorized that allowing PPAs in
the State would result in “cherry picking,” which could result in less
revenue for the utility and higher prices for consumers who did not
enter into PPAs.316 As previously stated, this analysis failed to
consider evidence of the impact of PPAs on public utilities in states

313. N.C. UTILS. COMM’N, NORTH CAROLINA’S PUBLIC UTILITY INFRASTRUCTURE
& REGULATORY CLIMATE: PRESENTATION TO THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION
ON ENERGY AND POLICY 3 (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.ncleg.net/documentsites
/committees/BCCI-6576/2013-2014/3%20-%20Dec.%203,%202013/5%20-%20Finley
%20NCUC%20Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/NU6Q-SS4Y].
314. Progress Solar Invs., LLC, Docket No. SP-100, SUB 24, at 1, 278 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 525, 526 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Nov. 25, 2009), 2009 WL 4197406.
315. See, e.g., Declaratory Order Regarding Third-Party Arrangements for Renewable
Energy Generation, Case No. 09-00217-UT, 10–11 (N.M. Pub. Reg. Comm’n Dec. 17,
2009) (“The Public Utility Act does not protect a public utility from all competition, such
as losing sales and revenues to a non-public utility entity engaged in retail sales.”).
316. N. C. Waste Awareness & Reduction Network (NC WARN), Docket No. SP-100,
SUB 31, at 26 (N.C. Utils. Comm’n Apr. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 1572367, at *26 (Order
Issuing Declaratory Ruling).
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that have allowed use of the agreements.317 As stated by the Iowa
Supreme Court in SZ Enterprises,
[c]ertainly, the case can be made that if Eagle Point is allowed
to “cream skim” the most profitable customers, there may be
impacts on the regulated utility. . . . There is nothing in the
record of this administrative proceeding, however, to gauge the
likelihood or degree of material impact, and there was no
suggestion that the integrity of the grid or economic health of
regulated providers has been adversely affected in states such
as California, Nevada, Arizona, and Colorado, where thirdparty PPAs are not considered public utilities for purposes of
regulation.318
Thus, the impact on the public and the impact on public utilities
are interrelated questions. The analysis of both should be based,
whenever possible, on empirical information. With respect to power
purchase agreements, that empirical information exists because
several states have already permitted the use of PPAs.319 Given the
information currently available from those states, it does not appear
that consumers or public utilities have been adversely affected by the
use of PPAs.320
The final consideration to determine whether to regulate a
proposed transaction is whether the legislature has made any relevant
public policy pronouncements. As stated in Simpson, the
determination of whether to regulate must “in the final analysis”
accomplish “the legislature’s purpose and comport[] with its public
policy.”321 Despite this statement in Simpson, the Utilities
Commission’s analysis in NC WARN never mentioned the express
public policies enacted in North Carolina favoring the development of
renewable energy resources. Therefore, the Commission ignored the
General Assembly’s stated public policy to use “the entire spectrum of
demand-side options, including but not limited to conservation, load
management and efficiency programs, as additional sources of energy
supply and/or energy demand reductions.”322 In addition, the statute
establishing the Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio
Standards provides that one of the purposes of the Standards is to

317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
(1978).
322.

See supra text accompanying notes 183–86.
SZ Enters. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 850 N.W.2d 441, 468 (Iowa 2014).
See supra Section IV.A.
Id.
State ex rel. Utils. Comm’n v. Simpson, 295 N.C. 519, 524, 246 S.E.2d 753, 756–57
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-2(a)(3a) (2015) (emphasis added).
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“[e]ncourage private investment in renewable energy and energy
efficiency.”323 These statutory pronouncements may not directly
answer the question of whether PPAs should be permitted in North
Carolina, but they demonstrate a clear public policy favoring the
development and expansion of renewable energy resources.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of North Carolina was correct in
Simpson when it stated that flexibility is required when assessing
whether to regulate a proposed transaction so as to “comport
legislative purpose with the variable nature of modern technology.”324
The factors set forth above allow for that type of flexibility. They also
support the case-by-case approach espoused by the court in Simpson
but hampered by Simpson’s focus on “the nature of the industry
sought to be regulated.”325 By moving attention away from the nature
of the industry and focusing instead on the nature of the transaction,
the proposed standard allows for greater innovation within the
electric industry and other regulated industries.
CONCLUSION
North Carolina is one of the few states that has expressly
prohibited PPAs.326 In its NC WARN decision, the Utilities
Commission based its prohibition against power purchase agreements
on a concern over the potential increased cost that could result to
some consumers if PPAs were permitted in the state. Specifically, the
Utilities Commission was concerned that if organizations like NC
WARN were not treated as public utilities and regulated by the
Commission, these organizations would “cherry pick” the most
lucrative customers from the public utility, leaving the public utility
with only the most costly customers to serve. Public utilities are
required to provide adequate service to all those within their
exclusive territory,327 and cannot discriminate between lucrative and
costly customers.328 Consequently, the Utilities Commission feared

323. Id. § 62-2(a)(10)(c).
324. Simpson, at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 757.
325. Id. at 524, 246 S.E.2d at 756.
326. The only state to prohibit PPAs judicially is Florida. See PW Ventures, Inc. v.
Nichols, 533 So.2d 281, 284 (Fla. 1988).
327. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-131(b) (“Every public utility shall furnish adequate,
efficient and reasonable service.”); see also supra text accompanying note 310.
328. This “traditional bargain” applies in other states as well. See, e.g., Trico Elec.
Coop. v. Corp. Comm’n of Ariz., 339 P.2d 1046, 1054 (1959) (“A public utility is a person,
corporation or association engaged in a business affected with a public interest and
therefore must serve everyone in the area where it operates who applies for service. It
cannot refuse such service.”).
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that allowing the more lucrative customers to reduce their reliance on
the public utility by entering into PPAs for lower-cost, solargenerated electricity would ultimately leave the public utility serving
fewer and more costly customers. This, in turn, would result in higher
prices for those consumers continuing to receive their electricity
exclusively from the public utility.
Ironically, given its concern about the higher cost of electricity
from permitting PPAs, the Utilities Commission’s decision actually
prevents consumers like Faith Community Church, which are not able
to self-finance solar PV systems, from receiving the lower-cost
electricity that solar PV systems could provide. The prohibition
against PPAs also fails to account for the fact that other states have
already permitted this type of arrangement without the adverse
consequences to the cost of electricity that served as the basis of the
Utilities Commission’s decision.329 Experience shows that states that
have expressly allowed PPAs have generally seen changes in the cost
of electricity consistent with the rest of the nation. Thus, the decision
to prohibit PPAs precludes lower-income consumers from accessing
the benefit of lower-cost solar energy that they would otherwise enjoy
and serves to protect against cost increases that appear unlikely to
actually occur. If North Carolina hopes to move towards more
equitable access to renewable energy resources, either the General
Assembly or the Supreme Court of North Carolina should act to
permit third-party financing for distributed solar PV systems.

329. DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY & EFFICIENCY,
3RD PARTY SOLAR PV POWER PURCHASE AGREEMENT (PPA) (Apr. 2017),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/DSIRE_3rd-PartyPPA_April_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5KH-5S3N] (showing states that have permitted
the use of PPAs).

